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FOREWORD

A guide to developing national standards for ammunition management

National ammunition standards help regulate a State’s ammunition and explosives-related processes, operations and activities, procedures and the people
involved, thereby enhancing the safety and security of ammunition stocks for all
those exposed to its risks. Only with national standards in place will it be possible
to provide safe and functional ammunition thus reducing the risk of diversion or
an unplanned explosive event.
The International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) provide an important
resource for national authorities to use as part of establishing and implementing
national standards. Besides making the process more straightforward, the development of national standards based on the IATG provides coherent, tested and
internationally approved methodologies for a State to use in managing risks from
their ammunition stockpile, while injecting quality and risk management principles
into the systems and organizations involved. The IATG’s approach makes a difficult
process more manageable for a given State and breaks the process into incremental
steps that can be more easily assessed, prioritized, and managed.
An impediment to date in the use of the IATG towards developing national stockpile
management standards has been the lack of guidance on how to translate the
IATG into national standards. This document is intended to help bridge that gap.
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INTRODUCTION

01 — Introduction

Figure 1 – D
 estroying surplus propellant by burning
(Source : Ammunition Technical Trade UK)

1.1 AIM OF THIS GUIDE
The guide aims to assist State authorities in the development of national standards
for ammunition management and towards implementing those standards across
State institutions. More specifically, it outlines the key considerations and processes
involved in the development of national standards, and provides advice for the
development of an organizational framework necessary for an effective, coordinated
and sustainable national ammunition management system.
Each State is different and will face differing ammunition management challenges.
With its full extent of more than 1,300 pages, applying the International Ammunition
Technical Guidelines (IATG) may first appear overwhelming.To make the IATG more
accessible for users, this guide summarizes each of the technical modules of the
IATG and highlights critical issues pertinent to ammunition safety and security,
which should be covered by national standards. Not all of the IATG topics may be
relevant for a State. Yet there are several universal issues in ammunition stockpile
management that will apply in some form to all States. These range from personnel
training and competence requirements, ammunition surveillance and inspections,
to risk management protocols and security of stocks, amongst others.
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As well as conforming to existing national legislation and other relevant norms,
national standards should, at a minimum, adhere to the guiding principles of the
IATG. They should reflect a State’s policies and provide requirements and guidance
for ammunition accounting, storage, processing, disposal, security and transport. 1)
They should protect those at risk from unintended events such as catastrophic
explosions and fires at munitions sites whilst enabling the prevention and mitigation
of such events. They should also enhance control over the State’s assets and
improve security to help minimize the risk of stockpile diversion.
This guide assists those responsible for drafting national regulations, by describing
an inclusive and coherent methodology for developing standards, and by providing a simplified approach towards addressing often complex ammunition topics.
Beyond the IATG volumes and modules, references are made to other guidance
and resources available, such as the IATG Implementation Support Toolkit, 2) the
UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods Model Regulations, 3)
and the Ammunition Life-cycle Management Handbook, 4) which may prove useful
in helping develop new or improve existing standards.

1.2 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE IATG AND NATIONAL STANDARDS
The IATG are a compilation of voluntary, practical guidelines on the safe and secure
management of ammunition. They are meant for States and organizations to use
in developing national standards, processes and procedures. 5)
The IATG were developed by the United Nations at the request of the General
Assembly and are overseen by the UN SaferGuard Programme.They were developed
to be consistent with “good practices” found around the globe, as well as the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards and guides. They are
also complementary to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), Integrated
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) and Modular
Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC), as well as relevant
international conventions and treaties.
National standards are issued by a national authority or an organization authorized
to act on its behalf. It may be appropriate for the national authority to commence
development of national standards by assigning a strategic body and a legal framework to steer the process, and at a minimum, by appointing a standard issuing
organization, as described later in this guide. National standards are generally
considered legally binding documents within a State.
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1.3 STRUCTURED APPROACH TO DEVELOPING NATIONAL STANDARDS
Most industrial sectors have a set of standards to regulate safety, security and
efficiency of the work they do and to ensure the quality of the products they produce.
The IATG conform to the recommendations and processes contained within the ISO
quality management systems (ISO 9001 :2008) and ISO risk management system
(ISO guide 51). Adopting the ISO format and language has provided significant
advantages to the IATG, including consistency in its layout, use of internationally
recognised terminology, and greater acceptance by international, regional and national
organizations who are accustomed to the ISO series of standards and guides.

Prior to publication of the first version of the IATG in 2011, States went their own way
in developing national standards, which were often adapted from various regional
standards and organizational guidelines. This frequently led to national standards
which were fractured and difficult to implement. With the availability of the IATG,
a State now has a resource which it can draw from to establish its own, legally
binding national standards and protocols.
National standards should not just duplicate relevant sections of the IATG, for a number
of reasons. The needs of a State may not warrant the entire scope offered by all
of the IATG’s 12 thematic volumes and 45 modules, but instead, a State may find that
a smaller number of national standards may be sufficient. Therefore, in developing
national standards, the aim should be to cover the functions, roles and responsibilities
for each core activity, in a manner that is achievable, measurable and legally defensible.
Additionally, the IATG provide guidance which should be incorporated into national
standards, taking into consideration national needs and processes.
When the national authority chooses to apply the IATG to guide the development
of standards for ammunition stockpile management, challenges associated with
the implementation of the IATG’s requirements can be better anticipated and thus
addressed more effectively.
During the first steps in planning national standards, success often depends on
the level of participation by relevant government bodies, armed forces and other
State key stakeholders. The best national standards come out of those processes
that involve all stakeholders, from the authorities at the top to those working at
the lowest levels. However, it is important to remember that the development of
national standards is a national responsibility, and external entities should only act
in an advisory role with final decision-making being made by national authorities.
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Similarly, in developing its national standards, a national authority may take advantage
of the IATG’s existing ISO language “shall”,“should” and “may” to indicate the level
of action required, as well as the quality and risk management systems integrated
within the IATG that can be directly implemented.

1.4 	SUPPORTIVE NATIONAL POLICY FRAMEWORK AND
STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH

01 — Introduction

Previous experience has shown that the highest levels of success occur if a State
addresses the development of standards using a step-by-step approach rather
than tackling the entire process all at once. For example, before standards can be
developed, a national policy has to be in place that directs the State’s approach
towards ammunition stockpile management, and that policy could be as simple as
“utilize the IATG”. Next, competent authorities owning the ammunition stockpile
management process should be identified. That could then be followed by the
establishment of a national, organizational framework with assigned roles and
responsibilities. These organizations would assess national ammunition stockpiles
against national and strategic requirements and determine what aspects of the
IATG are relevant and should be applied. They should also establish priorities for
the application of identified IATG topics and dictate the implementation level, in
line with the State resources, capacities and capabilities.
First selecting the topics that are more practically attainable, and those that address
known critical safety and security needs, is a better approach than attempting to
address all IATG topics at once. It is far better to move forward in this manner,
as failing early on with an overly-ambitious set of standards may challenge the
system to a point where officials feel discouraged from trying again. The application
of the IATG in creating national standards cannot feasibly be accomplished in a
short time, but should be viewed as a long-term effort, building on an established
framework consisting of national policy, competent authorities and organizational
structure. Within this framework, standards are developed and improved gradually
and incrementally as the national system matures and is capable of absorbing more.
Figure 2 – Example of a national policy framework, roles and responsibilities

Government
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Minister of Defence
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Unit commanders
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1.5	WHY EFFECTIVE AMMUNITION STOCKPILE
MANAGEMENT IS NECESSARY
Stockpile management is an important national responsibility and the most effective
mechanism for optimizing safety in storage, and reducing the risk of ammunition
diversion through loss, theft, fraud or illicit trade.

There are many examples of the consequences of ammunition and explosives that
have deteriorated or become damaged due to inadequate attention to storage,
handling and movement.The Geneva-based Small Arms Survey has recorded more
than 600 unplanned explosions at munitions sites since 1979. 6) Four different
examples of unplanned explosion events are shown below. These could have
been prevented or their effects could have been significantly reduced through risk
mitigation activities carried out as part of the implementation of national standards
for ammunition management.
• On the evening of 27 January 2002, an accidental detonation of a large stock of
military high explosives occurred at a storage facility located in the city of Lagos,
Nigeria. In addition to the main explosion, many fires and smaller explosions
were created by the kick-outs 7), which created panic that spread to other areas.
As people fled the scene, many stumbled into a darkness-concealed canal and
drowned. The explosion and its aftermath are believed to have killed at least
1,100 people and displaced over 20,000, with many thousands injured. 8)
• On 11 July 2011, at 5 :50 in the morning, an explosion tore through the Evangelos Florakis Naval Base in Cyprus. The cause of this mass explosion was
determined to be the auto-ignition of propellant, which was stored incorrectly,
in an inappropriate location and exposed to high temperatures, humidity and
temperature fluctuations, without having determined the propellant stabilizer
level, a very important surveillance requirement for propellant. The immediate
consequence was the loss of 13 personnel, with another 62 injured. The dead
included the commander of the Navy, the commander of the Naval Base, four
other Navy personnel, and six fire fighters who were trying to extinguish the
blaze that led to the explosion. The resulting blast destroyed a nearby power
plant and damaged buildings at the villages of Mari and Zygi, 1.7 km and 4.5
km away, respectively, from the blast site. Loss of the Vassilikou power station,
which provided approximately 50% of the power capacity for Cyprus, resulted in
11 |
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Stockpile management is as much about developing appropriate procedures, processes and systems as it is about storage and security infrastructure. Infrastructure
is expensive, but significant improvements in safety and security can be made at
minimal costs, through system and process improvements. Changes of attitude and
the development of an ethos of explosive safety can have a major impact on reducing
the current high global level of undesirable explosion events within ammunition
storage areas. A similar approach to the security of ammunition stockpiles would
make a major contribution to reducing the risk of diversion and onward proliferation.
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rolling blackouts lasting two to three hours, for months after. It has been estimated
that the cost of this entirely preventable disaster reached 10% of the gross
domestic product (GDP) of Cyprus at the time. 9)
• An explosion occurred in the Brak Al-Chati ammunition storage area in southern
Libya on 28 November 2013, killing over 40 people and injuring many others.Three
bunkers exploded in the incident, which appeared to have been caused by looters
igniting a fire to shine some light on their work. There were clear indications that
the diversion from State stockpiles had been ongoing for an extended period of
time with many, if not all, of the 20 bunkers emptied of bombs and projectiles. 10)
Consequently, illegally trafficked weapons and ammunition from Libya have been
traced to at least 12 other States in the region, and beyond.
• The New York Times reported an explosion that occurred on 23 September 2017,
at an ammunition depot in the town of Vinnytsya, about 160 miles southwest of
Kiev, Ukraine. One of the Ukrainian Army’s largest ammunition depots caught
fire overnight, setting off gigantic explosions and forcing the evacuation of about
30,000 people. Like a fireworks display, rocket artillery flew out of the depot in all
directions, tracing glowing arcs through the night sky. Other ammunition, such as
tank rounds, were thrown out of the depot into the surrounding area. The blasts
posed a serious danger to air traffic, passing trains and nearby communities.
According to the Ukrainian authorities, the depot held about 200,000 tonnes of
ammunition, and although it was unclear how much was at risk, the firepower
was on clear display. As warehouses exploded, gigantic, apocalyptic fireballs
rose high above the site. 11)
Figure 3 – D
 rone footage of an explosion in ammunition
storage area in Balakleya, Ukraine 12)
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How stockpile management contributes to achieving
the Sustainable Development Goals
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development represents a useful framework to
articulate the many potential contributions of ammunition management to broader
peace, security and development outcomes. Ammunition stockpile management
may be approached in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),
as recognized in General Assembly resolution 72/55 “Problems arising from the
accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus”.13) The resolution
encourages States to consider ammunition management as an intrinsic part of
their actions for achieving relevant SDG targets and urges them to develop national
indicators to measure it.

Strengthening the institutional capacities of States to better control
arms and ammunition help prevent conflict, violence, terrorism and
crime.
SDG 16, dedicated to peace, justice and strong institutions is a natural entry point
for national ammunition management. Improving ammunition security and safety
is a key measure to curbing illicit arms flows (encapsulated in SDG target 16.4)
and preventing unplanned explosions.
Figure 4 – T esting electronic artillery fuzes during surveillance.
(Source : Ammunition Technical Trade UK)
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 ffective ammunition management mitigates the risk of storage depots
E
accidentally exploding in populated areas.These explosions, when they
occur, are humanitarian disasters that lead to death, injury, economic loss,
displacement and destruction of infrastructure and private property.

02

OVERVIEW
OF THE IATG

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Designed to assist States in developing their own national standards and standing
operating procedures (SOPs), the IATG can be used to inform the development of
national standards. Taking into account the diversity of States and their available
material, financial and technical resources, the Risk Reduction Process Levels
(RRPL) embedded in the IATG offer a system of ascending comprehensiveness in
risk management. Accordingly, and regardless of their respective baseline, all States
can utilize the IATG as a framework for assessing and improving their ammunition
stockpile management processes.
The UN SaferGuard Programme manages the IATG and undertakes a formal review of
the IATG on a five-year basis to ensure that the IATG reflect developing ammunition
stockpile management norms and practices, and to incorporate changes due to
changing international regulations and requirements.

2.2 NATIONAL USE OF THE IATG
Stockpile management in accordance with international good practice is important in
ensuring that a national authority fulfills its duty of care and oversees the adequate
management of ammunition stockpiles.The IATG provide freely available, commonly
accepted, good practice that can be adopted by any State. As such, the IATG can be
used to provide the State with detailed technical elements that support policy and
legislation. They also form the basis for the drafting of national standards and SOPs
for individual ammunition and explosives facilities. The preparation and application
of the IATG are shaped by four guiding principles :
• Right of national governments to apply national standards to their national ammunition
stockpiles ;
• Need to protect those most at risk from undesirable explosion events (e.g. local
civilian communities and explosives workers) ;
• Requirement to build national capacity to develop, maintain and apply appropriate
standards for stockpile management ; and
• Need to maintain consistency and compliance with other international norms,
conventions and agreements.
15 |

02 — Overview of the IATG

The UN General Assembly requested the development of guidelines for ammunition
management in 2008. 14) The IATG were subsequently developed to improve safety
and security of ammunition stockpiles, and efficiency in their management.They are
based on international “good practice” and accepted explosive science, and provide
a common language and a frame of reference for States. Containing an integrated
quality management system, the IATG allow for a progressive improvement in
ammunition safety and security, in line with the national context and available
resources. As such, the IATG encourage authorities to achieve and demonstrate
significant risk reductions in ammunition stockpile safety and security.

It is important that national authorities adhere to these guiding principles, and that
improvements in stockpile management, where needed, are made in an integrated
and graduated manner, as resources become available.
Whereas the IATG provide a range of options and procedures towards effective
stockpile management, they also acknowledge that it can be an expensive process.
The scarcity of resources and conflicting national priorities for these resources in
some States mean that it is neither possible nor desirable to establish a global set
of criteria to dictate standards for ammunition management. Responding to such
resource and capacity gaps, the IATG are structured as a guidance framework
that provides options for a gradual improvement in safety and security within a
national risk management process. The IATG do not define a detailed way in which
ammunition safety and security requirements are to be achieved by every State :
these should be covered in national and local codes of practice.

02 — Overview of the IATG

2.3 OVERVIEW OF THE IATG VOLUMES
The IATG are comprehensive technical documents that are intended for use by
suitably qualified and experienced persons, whose competence enables them to
interpret, explain and apply the internationally recognized good practice contained
in the IATG.
IATG 01.10 (Introduction to Ammunition Technical Guidelines) 15) explains the background, legal standing and framework of the IATG. When defining and drafting policy
for managing ammunition and explosives, policy-makers and technical experts can
make a good start by considering which areas of ammunition management their
national policy will address within this generic framework :
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Series

Generic area

01

Introduction and Principles of Ammunition Management

02

Risk Management

03

Ammunition Accounting

04

Explosive Facilities (Storage) (Field and Temporary Conditions)

05

Explosive Facilities (Storage) (Infrastructure and Equipment)

06

Explosive Facilities (Storage) (Operations)

07

Ammunition Processing

08

Transport of Ammunition

09

Security of Ammunition

10

Ammunition Demilitarization and Destruction

11

Ammunition Accidents, Reporting and Investigation

12

Ammunition Operational Support

02 — Overview of the IATG

Table 1 – The 12 thematic volumes of the IATG

2.4 USE OF TECHNICAL LANGUAGE
Since their introduction, there have been requests for the IATG to be simplified for
the non-technical user.This continues to be resisted because they are meant to cover
the bulk of activities involved in through-life management (TLM) of ammunition.
To this end, the IATG must be technically detailed so that State ammunition and
explosives practitioners, as well as international assistance providers, can extract
relevant technical information in necessary detail, to ensure the safe and secure
management of ammunition and explosives in conformity with international good
practice. In this vein, oversimplification would introduce the risk of applying unsafe
practices.
One of the outcomes of writing and implementing national standards is to give policymakers and practitioners, at all levels, the tools that they need to deliver safe and
secure ammunition management, in terms that all can understand and agree upon. In
this way, a glossary of local terms can be created that links to the technical language
and the glossary of the IATG 16). In turn, this enables effective communication
between different groups involved in national ammunition management. In the
realm of the policy writer with responsibility for drafting national standards, there
are terms that should be agreed at the outset. These are listed and described in
the glossary at the end of this guide.
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2.5 AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT IS A NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
According to IATG 01.10, stockpile management refers to the procedures and activities
on safe and secure accounting, storage, transportation, handling and disposal of
conventional ammunition. These are often complex technical areas that, to be safe
and secure, require specialist management structures and procedures.The UN General
Assembly 17) has recognized the importance of appropriate national ammunition
management structures and procedures. These include laws and regulations,
training and doctrine, equipment and maintenance, personnel management and
finances and infrastructure problems arising from the accumulation of conventional
ammunition stockpiles in surplus.

02 — Overview of the IATG

Appropriate national management structures and procedures ensure sustainability in
ammunition management. In this regard, the UN General Assembly 18) emphasises
the central role of the provision of technical assistance and capacity building to
Member States upon their request (A/RES/72/55) :
• Encouraging States, as appropriate, to consider ammunition management as
an intrinsic part of their actions for achieving relevant targets of the Sustainable
Development Goals related to the reduction of illicit arms flows and the prevention of violence through strengthened institutions, and to consider, where
relevant, developing national, regional and sub-regional indicators based on this
understanding ;
• Encouraging States, where relevant, to develop voluntary national action plans on
the safe and secure management of conventional ammunition, and acknowledges
the utility of information-sharing and the benefit of good practices among States,
as appropriate.
In this vein, IATG 01.10 states that the primary responsibility for conventional ammunition
stockpile management shall rest with the government of the State holding the
ammunition. This responsibility should normally be vested in an authority, which
is charged with the regulation, management and coordination of conventional
ammunition stockpile management. The national authority shall be responsible for
establishing the national and local conditions that enable the effective management
of conventional ammunition. It is ultimately responsible for all phases and all facets
of the stockpile management processes within its national boundaries, including
the development of national standards, SOPs and instructions.
Troop-Contributing Nations (TCNs) to UN peacekeeping operations are further
expected to, in addition to adhering to UN policies and procedures, develop SOPs
alongside national standards for the sound management of the ammunition stockpiles
within their national contingents deployed around the globe, to harness the UN
safety requirements and local conditions of the host States.
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2.6	FUNCTIONAL AREAS WITHIN CONVENTIONAL
AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT

02 — Overview of the IATG

IATG 01.30 (Policy development and advice) 19) notes that stockpile management is
not only about the technical requirements of ensuring the safety and security of
ammunition and explosives but also covers areas such as the determination of
stockpile size, types of stockpile and the management of ammunition in service.
In establishing the scope for national standards, a holistic approach is encouraged.
National standards should encompass safety, security and through-life management
aspects of ammunition management. The IATG approach this by recognition of six
functional areas within conventional ammunition management. For ease of reference,
the functional areas and requirements (functions) with corresponding IATG are
offered in Table 2 (see IATG 01.30, Table 1).
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Table 2 – Functional areas in conventional ammunition stockpile management
Functional
Area

Requirements

IATG

Ammunition
Management

•
•
•
•
•

Inventory Management System and Procedures
Risk Management System and Procedures
Procurement System and Procedures
Hazard Classification System
Accident, Fault and Performance Failure
Investigation Capability and Procedures
• Ammunition Surveillance and In-Service Proof
Capability and Procedures

•
•
•
•
•

Ammunition
Storage

• Field and Temporary Storage Procedures and
Operations
• Depot Storage Procedures and Operations
• Safe Depot Storage Infrastructure
• Unit Storage Procedures and Operations
• Safe Unit Storage Infrastructure

•
•
•
•
•

Ammunition
Processing

• Ammunition Inspection Capability and
Procedures
• Ammunition Maintenance Capability and
Procedures
• Ammunition Repair Capability and Procedures
• Ammunition Process Building Infrastructure

• IATG 06 Series
and 07.10
• IATG 06 Series
and07.10
• IATG 06 Series
• IATG 05 Series

Ammunition
Disposal

• Identification of Ammunition for Disposal
Methodology
• Disposal Technology and Infrastructure
• Disposal Capability and Procedures

• IATG 03.10

• Physical Security Infrastructure of Explosive
Storage Areas
• Security System Capability and Procedures
• Vetting System for Staff

• IATG 09.10

• Transport Procedures in accordance with
International and National Legislation
• Intrinsically Safe Vehicles

• IATG 08.10

Ammunition
Security

Ammunition
Transport
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IATG 03.10
IATG 02.10
N/A
IATG 01.50
IATG 01.60, 01.70,
11.10 and 11.20
• IATG 07.20
IATG 04.10
IATG 06 Series
IATG 05 Series
IATG 06 Series
IATG 12 Series

• IATG 10.10
• IATG 10.10

• IATG 09.10
• IATG 09.10

• N/A
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03

NATIONAL
STANDARDS
DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS

The aim of this chapter is to help understand the scope and content of national
standards and walk through the main processes in their development.This is achieved
by, as far as possible without being prescriptive, addressing the various issues in
the format of what is the issue, why is it important and how can it be addressed.
A national standard is a document that is executed by the national authority to
comply with the regulatory framework and to control the safety, security, quality
and efficiency of the ammunition and explosives sector. It is important that it is
written by and for the State by the national authority because national authorities
understand the political, cultural, social, economic and technical needs that the
legislature must address, better than any external agency could. The proposed
outlined process for developing national standards, which belies a great deal of
detail to be addressed in each stage, is shown in figure 5 and Annex II.
Figure 5 – Outline process for developing national standards for ammunition management
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3.1 UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM
Effective management of national ammunition stocks is a complex and costly
endeavour. The challenges are even greater in conflict-affected States due to lack
of resources, infrastructure and trained personnel.Yet, all ammunition management
environments can be characterized by some struggle over resources and a degree
of pressure to address concerns related to ammunition safety and security. In order
to decide what to do first, where it sits in the hierarchy of complex problems, how
to set goals and eventually achieve them, a State’s legislature and national authority
need to understand the scale and scope of the issues pertinent to ammunition
and explosives in their State.

03 — National Standards Development Process

Box 1 – E mergence and evolution of ammunition management standards in
the United Kingdom
The UK’s development of its national standards for explosives and ammunition
management dates back to the 19th century.The Explosives Act of 1875 was the first
piece of civil legislation to address the control of explosives and was introduced to
prevent the diversion of explosives to anarchists and Irish Republican groups. During
this period, single service ammunition and explosive regulations, issued under the
authority of the Secretary of State for War, covered the control and management of
ammunition in magazines, in the hands of army field units, and in Royal Navy shore
establishments and vessels.
In 1974, a number of statutory instruments were issued under the primary Health and
Safety at Work Act, which covered the control, manufacture and storage of explosives.
UK military explosive regulations were later rationalized into a single set of joint service
explosive regulations in 2000. As a result of the catastrophic loss of a Nimrod aircraft
over Afghanistan in 2006, major changes were made to how the UK assures the safety
of all of its defence-related activities.Though ammunition and explosives were not the
cause of the aircraft loss, it resulted in the creation of the Defence Ordnance, Munitions
and Explosives Safety Regulator.
The principal drivers today for the development of UK national standards and
regulations for ammunition control and management come from the UK’s interaction
with supranational entities such as the United Nations, the European Union and the
North AtlanticTreaty Organization.
Author : Bob Seddon. Source : Development and Evolution of
National Ammunition Management Standards in the UK.
Unpublished background paper. Geneva : Small Arms Survey

Experiences shared by government representatives, the UN, military and international organizations conclude that unplanned explosions and diversion are symptoms
of various shortcomings : lack of political awareness, lack of staff capacity, skills
and adequate infrastructure, or institutional, governance and oversight issues. 20)
Whereas “national ownership is a pre-requisite, commitment at the top level of
government does, however, not necessarily trickle down to those actually doing
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the job on the ground. On occasion, implementing agencies are asked for support,
but once in country, cooperation from local storage holders is not guaranteed.
Likewise, commitment may be found on the ground whilst lacking at the top level,
requiring that it be nurtured at all levels. Effective ammunition management is driven
nationally and takes into account country-specific situations.” 21)
Accordingly, national authority and international assistance providers should consider
using structured analytical techniques and tools to determine the baseline for safety
and security risks to be addressed, the influence of external factors on national
ammunition management, and assessment of national capabilities. Below are
three exemplary tools for a structured approach to examining potential risks with
ammunition :

In the IATG, the different tasks and activities necessary for safe, efficient and effective
stockpile management are considered to equate to one of three Risk Reduction
Process Levels (RRPLs), indicated within each IATG as either LEVEL 1 (basic),
LEVEL 2 (intermediate) or LEVEL 3 (advanced), depending on the degree of complexity of each task or activity.
The UN SaferGuard Programme provides an online RRPL checklist tool 22) that
can be used to develop a snapshot of the current state of a single ammunition
site against the RRPLs described in IATG 01.20. The RRPL checklist is useful for
obtaining information about the risks concerning a storage or processing site at any
point in time. It can be used to capture the baseline as the national authority sets
about improving ammunition safety management and then measuring progress
by comparison of new checklists against old ones, as improvement measures are
introduced and used.
Using the tool, RRPLs are determined by calculating a weighted score of all the
questions answered about an ammunition stockpile site. To achieve a given RRPL,
the site’s score must meet or exceed the appropriate score threshold and all critical
questions for the RRPL must be satisfactorily answered. To make best use of the
RRPL checklist tool, as part of the baseline study, the analyst will need to extract
and collate information from site reports to identify trends. It should be looking for
generic areas and groups of activities where there is consistently good practice as
well as those where there is cause for concern.
To determine the status of a State’s ammunition stockpile, all its ammunition
stockpile locations would need to be assessed and the individual results compiled
into a composite status report. The status report would establish a baseline from
which to move forward. The national authority should pay particular attention to
those questions that relate to safety-critical activities and, if there is a national
trend of not meeting the requirements of these activities, recommend actions
to improve the situation. Trends so identified inform the national authority about
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Risk reduction baseline study

general areas of concern and feed into the strategic and operational plans for achieving
the national ammunition safety and security goals. Spotting emerging risks that
involve ammunition and explosives before they materialize is obviously a life-saving
activity but can also prove tremendously helpful in deciding on the priorities i.e.
which standards to develop first.
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It is proposed that national standards are based on the IATG 01.20 principle that
“the basic aim of a conventional ammunition stockpile management organisation
should be to make sure that stockpile management processes are maintained at
Risk Reduction Process Level 1 as a minimum, which will reduce risk significantly”.
Ongoing and gradual improvements should then be made to the stockpile management infrastructure and processes as staff development improves and further
resources become available. A national authority should take note that the rate of
progress towards overall RRPL 1 and beyond is under their control and that it is
quite possible for a site to be at RRPL 2 or RRPL 3 for one activity while not yet
being at RRPL 1 for others.
PESTLE analysis
As a national authority acknowledges the presence of a problem involving ammunition and explosive materials, the authority and its partners may seek to identify
the underlying causes and contributing factors to the problem. Understanding
the problem environment is a pre-requisite for the development of effective and
responsive policies, legislation and national standards to tackle it. PESTLE 23) analysis
provides one methodology for this. A national authority can use PESTLE to map
multiple interlinked factors that may have contributed to the problem and assess
the effects of these factors outside the authority’s control on its performance.
PESTLE frames the identified problem with six external factors, to allow a judgement
to be made on their importance within the problem. The factors to consider are
political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental, each that may
have either a positive (opportunities) or negative (threats) influence on the problem.
Refer to Annex III for unpacking PESTLE in the ammunition risk mapping context,
pertinent to the development and prioritization of standards.
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Figure 6 – External factors that may influence known risks from ammunition stockpiles
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Capability lines of development
In most States, ammunition and explosives are a significant defence capability.
Ministries of defence make use of capability lines of development to ensure a
common approach to the introduction, sustainability of new and existing capabilities,
as well as disposal of obsolete capabilities. Ensuring the interoperability of different
systems and organizations involved in ammunition stockpile management is at the
core of such capability development. The lines of development are also used to
analyze the existing capabilities so that areas for improvement can be identified in a
State, hence providing valuable advice to its national standards development process.
In this vein, the UN SaferGuard Programme is currently considering a new IATG
module addressing “organisational capabilities” to be included in the forthcoming
version 3 of the IATG to be released in 2020. Once approved, this module will
introduce elements integral to organisational capability development, including
processes, functional roles and “capability enabling lines”. It will describe the
interaction between these three elements, and explain key processes in the life
cycle of ammunition, namely the planning, evaluation, procurement, introduction,
utilisation and decommissioning.
National authorities should note that although these capability development frameworks are commonly used by the military, they are equally applicable for a State that
is developing complex capabilities. In the United Kingdom, for example, the Ministry
of Defence acknowledges eight distinct lines of capability development, namely
training, equipment, personnel, information, concepts and doctrine, organization,
infrastructure, and logistics. Refer to Annex IV for a description of the UK model
of capability lines of development.
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Technological

3.2 INITIATE LEGISLATION
In establishing national standards, legislation is required to bring them into force.The
legislature will need to enact laws that assist the establishment and authorization of
the national authority (regulator) ; the adoption of the relevant IATG as the basis for
national standards ; and the application of the IATG in national standards and SOPs.
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Once appointed, the national authority has a legal responsibility to ensure that the
risks that their explosives present to the general public are both tolerable and as
low as reasonably practicable (ALARP), should an explosive event occur in storage
or during transport. This safeguarding of the public and the personnel involved in
ammunition management should be enshrined in legislation. A safeguarding law
should prevent the establishment of dwellings within the safeguarded area. Should
dwellings nonetheless remain in the safeguarded area, the law should stipulate
options to guide political decisions to address the risk :
• The explosive quantity permitted for storage shall be reduced within the facility
to a tolerable risk level ;
• The increased risk to the civilian population shall be formally accepted by the State
and communicated to the residents along with entitlement to a due compensation
in the event of an accident ;
• The civilian population shall be moved from the safeguarded area ;
• The ammunition shall be moved from the safeguarded area to another location.
Refer to Annex V for guidance on the rationale for safeguarding law.
The legislature should make a statement in legislation or regulation that it either adopts
the societal and individual risk levels that are suggested in Table 3 of IATG 02.10, or
provides nationally accepted tolerable risk levels. The national authority then has
a baseline from which it can make reasonable judgements when translating the
RRPLs into national standards.
The national authority and legislature need to appreciate that there will always be
a degree of risk associated with each RRPL. The overall degree of risk accepted by
the State will reduce as more and more of the processes and practices linked to
each RRPL are applied. National authorities should note the warnings in IATG 04.10
and 04.20 that quantity distances for field and temporary storage provide short-term
solutions ; not the same degree of protection as those for permanent facilities
given in IATG 02.20.
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3.3 MAP THE OPTIONS AND CHOOSE THE MOST APPROPRIATE

The legislature and national authority will make a judgement on what activities
are necessary to achieve an acceptable and achievable level of ammunition and
explosives safety and security for the State. This could take the form of a roadmap
and involve a decision published as a governmental statement, edict or decree
informing that the State will take the necessary actions to adopt the principles and
good practice of the IATG. This, or a formal act of the legislature, will demonstrate
the State’s commitment to ammunition and explosives safety. Having this formal
commitment would give the international community confidence in providing assistance to the national authority to develop national standards and in supporting the
necessary enabling projects. Such public commitment to adopt an internationally
recognized guidance framework should also prevent well-meaning international
assistance providers from delivering equipment, infrastructure or training that is
inappropriate at a particular stage of the State’s capability development.

3.4 ESTABLISH STRATEGY AND PRIORITIES
An ammunition and explosives safety and security strategy that comes from the
heart of government demonstrates to internal agencies that the State’s ammunition
and explosives stockpile management issues have been given serious consideration.
It also indicates that a way to improve the situation has been identified, if not yet in
place. Equally important, it demonstrates to external supporters and agencies that
the problem is going to be addressed and provides a platform for bids for financial
and/or physical assistance.
A good national strategy will explain the issues to be addressed, their relative
importance in the contexts of the existing security, economic and political realities,
and the State’s intent to improve the situation over time.
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Once the challenges pertaining to ammunition stockpiles are understood and reported
by the national authority, the legislature will better understand the multi-faceted
nature of the challenge and therefore the options and any recommendations made
by the national authority.

Box 2 – Timescales
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In the immediate aftermath of the US-led coalition military operations in Iraq in 2003,
it was estimated that clearance of all explosive remnants of war could take over 50
years. In Ukraine, it is estimated that disposing of all Soviet-era stockpiles at the current
pace will require more than 100 years. Meanwhile, the national authorities in Laos and
Vietnam have estimated at least 200 years of work to remove all explosive hazards
from the wars of the 1960s. In Europe, several States still come across explosive
ordnance from World War 2. It seems obvious that an explosives and ammunition
safety and security strategy should be able to reduce the hazards and risks to levels
that are acceptable to all parties involved and achievable in an acceptable timeframe,
with available resources. National authorities and international assistance providers
understand that in most cases in recent history, the challenge pertinent to ammunition
and explosives is not something that can be solved over a short period of time.

The national authority therefore needs to advise the legislature on a strategy that
can achieve reasonable levels of explosives safety and security appropriate for the
State. Ideally, the State ambition will align with appropriate Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) and lean towards internationally accepted norms contained in the
IATG. The ammunition and explosives safety and security strategy should also
align with relevant security sector reform (SSR) strategies, goals and development
programmes that might be in place. Experience suggests that the level of political
will and availability of resources will determine the actual timescale for achieving
strategic goals in ammunition safety and security but that planners should think
in terms of a 20- to 50-year programme, depending on the magnitude of risk and
response capabilities at the outset.
Requirements for through-life management of ammunition
To effectively mitigate the risks of unplanned explosions and diversion from stockpiles,
ammunition management requires complex systems, which present planning
challenges and have significant budgetary implications for governments. A systemsbased approach to through-life management of ammunition and a long-term strategy
to execute it can help a State to address these challenges and, in particular, to mitigate
diversion and the risk of unplanned explosions at munitions sites. A statement that
reflects through-life approach to planning, procurement, safe and secure stockpile
management and ultimate disposal of ammunition and explosives could be included
in the strategy with the details included in associated national standards.
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Box 3 – L essons from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) :
developing an ammunition master plan
While the international community substituted expertise for a lack of national capacity
in post-conflict BiH up to 2012, it subsequently built government capacity to ensure its
ownership of the system for life-cycle management of ammunition (LCMA). Following
its establishment in December 2010, the EUFOR Ammunition and Weapon Storage
Site Management MobileTrainingTeam (MTT project) played a key role in this process.
Since then, the MTT project has :

The international community has also encouraged BiH government and armed forces
personnel, including the minister of defence and chief of defence, to take a more
prominent role in addressing the challenges posed by the vast ammunition stockpiles.
As a result of these efforts, high ranking BiH government personnel have taken the lead
in related decision-making and planning, including through the development of the
Ammunition, Weapons and Explosives Master Plan.
Source : Carapic and Holtom,
Small Arms Survey Briefing Paper, 2018

3.5 ASSIGN GOALS AND MILESTONES
Acknowledging that achieving the highest standard of explosives security and safety
management can take decades, and that available resources to accelerate this
process are limited in any State ; a step-by-step approach to achieving the State’s
desired end-state should be encouraged. If the State’s published intent is to apply
the IATG as the basis of explosives security and safety regulations, the national
authority will need to understand the goals and milestones that are to be achieved
and write national standards that enable those goals and required working practices.
The national authority will need to advise on setting the State’s goals. Knowing
the baseline and desired end-state, the national authority should use, for example,
information resulting from the above risk reduction baseline study, PESTLE and
capability lines of development analyses, to establish interim goals that will lead to
the end-state. To fit these goals into a structured plan, they should contain SMART
objectives, i.e. being specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound.
Including SMART objectives for established goals will support their implementation,
simplify monitoring and improve arguments for funds and other resources.
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– Provided needs-based, tailor-made, modular ammunition management training
courses, which the BiH Ministry of Defence (MoD) subsequently integrated into the
BiH armed forces structure and curricula ;
– Coordinated equipment donations for stockpile management capacity building and
training efforts ; and
– Provided advice to the BiH MoD and the armed forces for sustainable LCMA,
particularly the development of regulations and SOPs for stockpile management,
including for ammunition accounting and disposal.

To reduce risk significantly, IATG (01.20) encourages ongoing improvements to the
stockpile management infrastructure and processes as staff development improves
and further resources become available. Let us assume that the State’s ammunition
and explosives safety management strategy is to achieve RRPL1 as a major milestone.
The aim of national RRPL goal-setting should be to :
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• Rank the results 24) of the national authority’s gap analyses according to :
• How important they are in the overall strategy
• How feasible they are within existing resources
• How feasible they are with external assistance
• Determine the order in which the gaps are to be filled, i.e. set the national authority’s
goals or objectives. The national authority should consider setting these goals
in the manner of SMART objectives.
• Put in place a monitoring and auditing regime to measure progress.
Gap analysis identifies and analyses gaps between the optimal resource allocation
and the current allocation level to reveal areas that can be improved. If a State, for
example, has set an ammunition safety management strategy of achieving RRPL1,
the activities that trigger a “RRPL1 Level RED” outcome on the RRPL checklist
are gaps in capability that need to be plugged.

3.6 ALLOCATE RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE GOALS
The framework of goals and objectives should support the priorities of work in a
national context including which IATG, and in what order, are to be applied in national
standards.The priorities are sensitive to the circumstances that prevail in each State
context at a given time. There are some generalities however, that come about
from the political, economic, cultural and historical factors that affect all States. In
general, all States have a duty to ensure the safety of their people i.e. defending
them from internal and external threats. Accepting this premise, a State will need
security forces and law enforcement that are properly constituted, trained and
armed to meet these threats effectively.
The first ammunition- and explosives-related decision to be made by the State is
therefore to define the roles, size and structure of its security forces. This in turn will
define the weapons required and therefore the ammunition for these weapons.
The activities that should take place at early stages in the development and implementation of national standards include at least : disposal of surplus/unsafe stock ;
movement of ammunition to safe and secure storage or disposal facilities ; storage
in depots and small units ; and management of storage and disposal facilities. Since
the aim of national standards is to underpin the State policy about the safety and
security of ammunition and explosives, it seems that all of these essential activities
are of equal priority and mutually supportive, therefore to be included in the early
iterations of national standards.
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Resource allocation is made difficult given these priority activities. It is the national
authority’s responsibility to advise the government, as well as the owners of the
available resources, on what needs to be done (informed by the structured analytical
process discussed on pp. 25-27), what can be achieved using the existing resources,
and what needs to be done using external assistance. Resources for ammunition
management cannot be summed up in a guide – each State having different priorities
and available funds.

• Funding
Effective ammunition stockpile management and improvements or enhancements
can be expensive. The State will want to use its own funds efficiently and can also
call upon assistance from international providers.
• People
Suitably qualified and experienced ammunition and explosives specialists are
necessary for the efficient, safe and secure management of the ammunition stockpile.
Many States have such people in their population, either military or civilian, but
experience in conflict-affected States suggests that these individuals can be
overlooked in the drive to rehabilitate combatants and rebuild the State. In terms
of effective capacity building, the legislature should endeavour to find existing
specialists and/or to make use of international assistance opportunities to recruit,
train and sustain this expertise within their national authority and ammunition
management system.
• Real estate
Safe and secure storage, processing, disposal, test and evaluation, and handling
of ammunition and explosives require considerable investment in real estate.
The national authority needs to ensure that any land occupied has a safeguarded
area or “buffer zone”,which might be owned by private individuals or government ;
either way, the national authority must have a good working relationship with the
national and/or local authority that is responsible for the land.
• Equipment
Ammunition and explosives handling requires both common and special equipment,
depending on the explosive article and the process or activity being undertaken.
Specialist equipment could be provided by the ammunition manufacturer or
specified by the national authority or their process engineer. All equipment can
be costly to either purchase or lease and the national authority or procurement
organization should always ensure that there is a suitable maintenance contract
and package associated with the purchase or lease. All equipment must be
maintained correctly to ensure that it is safe to use and store. The national authority
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The scale of the problem to be resolved can be understood once the legislature
and the national authority consider the resources that are required, against those
that are available : real estate, people, equipment, funds and time. The issue of safe
and secure management of ammunition cannot be resolved solely by throwing
money at it. Resources that a State has in its power are :

should consider having its own research and development department for designing,
manufacturing, testing and approving tools and equipment that will be used in
its facilities.
• Time
The State should control the arrival and departure times of imports and exports of
ammunition and explosives. The national authority should be able to make fairly
accurate estimates of the duration of projects to aid planning of major events
such as the opening of new facilities, the carrying out of safeguarding routines
and special facility inspections. All of these time factors should be accounted for
in the State’s ammunition and explosives management strategy and the various
SMART objectives that come out of the gap analysis discussed earlier.
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3.7 DETERMINE TOPICS TO BE COVERED IN NATIONAL STANDARDS
Experience in adopting and applying international standards shows that not every
part of the IATG should be included in national standards. Not all of the IATG modules
will be relevant to a State context. Some States have existing standards for explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD), for example, and corresponding systems for training and
regimes. When drafting national standards, selecting the critical and achievable
IATG volumes and modules first, in particular in a state with limited resources, is a
better approach than attempt to directly adopt a comprehensive set of international
standards, or a de facto a copy of the IATG.
Within the national standards chapters that the national authority has selected to
draft, it is suggested that the national authority make use of relevant IATG but, more
importantly, only those elements from within the IATG that will be used immediately
and will support the next one or two stages of the process towards safe and secure
management of ammunition.
Is the premise of achieving RRPL 1 reasonable for my country’s needs ?
Risk Reduction Process Level 1 describes a level of risk that should be tolerable
in most societies, acceptable to most governments and achievable given suitable
support and resources.
The meaning of RRPL 1 is that :
• Basic safety precautions are in place to reduce the risk of undesirable explosions
during ammunition storage, but fatalities and injuries to individuals in local civilian
communities may still occur.
• Although some potential causes of such explosions have been addressed (external
fires, smoking, mobile phones etc.), others remain (propellant instability, handling,
lightning strike).
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• Risk of explosion still remains, as routine physical inspection of the ammunition
does not occur and the chemical stability of ammunition during storage cannot be
determined by analysis.
• Basic security precautions are in place to reduce the risk of theft by external actions.
• Ammunition has been accounted for by quantity, and a basic system of identifying
loss or theft is in place.
• A minimal investment of resources has taken place in organizational development,
operating procedures and storage infrastructure.
Section 5 of IATG 01.20 25) lists the IATG and elements within them that are directly
relevant to RRPL1. It is a helpful resource to assist planning in a national context
regarding what is urgent, what is important, and how to take steps toward enhanced
safety and security in the development and implementation of national standards.

IATG risk reduction measures can be understood to primarily benefit the civilian
population in proximity to a stockpile of ammunition, and the personnel involved in
managing it. Regardless of the applicable RRPL, one of the best ways to plan and
situate storage areas is to put the ammunition a safe distance away (IATG 02.20)
from people either by moving the ammunition, or by moving the people. When
these requirements cannot be met, a detailed consequence analysis must be
carried out to fully understand the effects of not meeting required safe distances.
The residual risk must be approved at the right level of authority within the State,
and communicated to local population and personnel affected. With a view to
immediate safety and security improvements, table 3 lays out all IATG modules
and suggests priority considerations for the establishment of national standards
and the implementation of specific elements within ammunition management.
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Which IATG modules should be considered and why ?

Table 3 – Suggested priority considerations on elements within ammunition management
Volume

Module

01 Introduction
and Principles
of Ammunition
Management

01.10 Guide to the ammunition technical guidelines (IATG)
01.20 Index of risk reduction process levels
01.30 Policy development and advice
01.40 Glossary of terms, definitions and abbreviations
01.50 UN explosive hazard classification system and codes
01.60 Ammunition faults and performance failures
01.70 Bans and constraints
01.80 Formulae for ammunition management
01.90 Ammunition management personnel competences
02.10 Introduction to risk management principles and processes
02.20 Quantity and separation distances
02.30 Licensing of explosive facilities
02.40 Safeguarding of explosive facilities
02.50 Fire safety
03.10 Inventory management
03.20 Lotting and batching
03.30 International transfer of ammunition module
03.40 E nd-Use(r) of internationally transferred ammunition
module
03.50 Tracing of ammunition
04.10 Field storage
04.20 Temporary storage
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02 Risk Management

03 Ammunition
Accounting

04 Explosives
Facilities : Field
and Temporary
Conditions
05 Explosives
Facilities :
Infrastructure and
Equipment

06 Explosives
Facilities :
Operations
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05.10 Planning and siting of explosives facilities
05.20 Types of buildings for explosives facilities
05.30 Traverses and barricades
05.40 Safety standards for electrical installations
05.50 V ehicles, mechanical handling equipment in explosives
facilities
05.60 Radio frequency hazards
06.10 Control of explosive facilities
06.20 Storage space requirements
06.30 Storage and handling
06.40 Ammunition packaging and marking
06.50 Specific safety precautions
06.60 Works services (construction and repair)
06.70 Inspection of explosives facilities
06.80 Inspection of ammunition

Priority























Volume

Module

07 Ammunition
Processing

07.10 Safety and risk reduction
07.20 Surveillance and in-service proof
08.10 Transport of ammunition




09.10 Security principles and systems
10.10 D
 emilitarization and destruction of conventional
ammunition



11.10 Ammunition accidents : reporting and investigation
11.20 Ammunition accidents : investigation methodology
11.30 E OD clearance of ammunition storage area explosions




12.10 Ammunition on multi-national operations
12.20 Small unit ammunition storage



Priority for drafting national standards chapters
Each national authority will have a unique set of priorities that result from its political,
economic, security, environmental and social situation at any one time. It follows that
the national authority will draft its national standards to meet these national priorities.
There are, however, occasions when a newly formed national authority may have to
start with a completely blank slate. One way of prioritizing the order of writing national
standards is to base them on the experience of others, basing the framework of
national standards on the most common activities in a fairly recognizable order of
occurrence. If we look at this from the viewpoint of an item of ammunition, this
could look like the following :
• Inspection
The item is inspected to determine what it is, if it is suitable for use and whether
it is safe to move to a storage or disposal facility. While it is possible to rely on
the expertise of international assistance providers, local staff will need to be
able to either make their own decisions on these matters or understand the
decisions made on their behalf. This will require national standards based on
understanding the following IATG :
• IATG 01.50 – UN explosive hazard classification system and codes
• IATG 07.10 – Ammunition Processing : safety and risk reduction
• Movement
The item will need to be moved from where it was found, to either a storage
facility or a disposal area. The national standards will need an understanding of :
• IATG 01.50 – UN Explosive hazard classification system and codes
• IATG 08.10 – Transport of ammunition
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08 T ransport of
Ammunition
09 S ecurity of
Ammunition
10 Ammunition
Demilitarization
and Destruction
11 Ammunition
Accidents,
Reporting and
Investigation
12 Ammunition
Operational
Support

Priority
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• Storage
A commonly observed route to RRPL1 is for storage facilities to progress from
field storage, through temporary storage to permanent storage, with small unit
storage being a permanent requirement. The national authority will therefore
need to draft national standards appropriately, based on an understanding of :
• IATG 01.50 – UN explosive hazard classification system and codes
• IATG 02.20 – Quantity and separation distances
• IATG 02.30 – Licensing of explosive facilities
• IATG 02.50 – Fire safety
• IATG 04.10 – Field storage
• IATG 04.20 – Temporary storage
• IATG 05.10 – Planning and siting of explosive facilities
• IATG 05.30 – Traverses and barricades
• IATG 05.40 – Safety standards for electrical installations
• IATG 05.50 – Vehicles and mechanical handling equipment in explosive facilities
• IATG 06.10 – Control of explosive facilities
• IATG 06.30 – Storage and handling
• IATG 06.50 – Specific safety precautions
• IATG 12.20 – Small unit ammunition storage
• Disposal
A State is likely to have a problem with legacy munitions that are no longer of any
use and that must be destroyed. The national standards will require a detailed
understanding of :
• IATG 10.10 – Demilitarization and destruction of conventional ammunition
• Through-life management of ammunition and explosives
Underpinning all of these activities, the national authority will need to be cognisant
of the following IATG and draft the relevant national standards when it is appropriate
to do so :
• IATG 01.10 – Guide to the IATG
• IATG 01.20 – Index of risk reduction process levels
• IATG 01.30 – Policy development and advice
• IATG 01.90 – Ammunition management personnel competences
• IATG 02.10 – Introduction to risk management principles and processes
• IATG 02.40 – Safeguarding of explosive facilities
• IATG 03.10 – Inventory management
• IATG 11.10 – Ammunition accidents : reporting and investigation
• IATG 11.20 – Ammunition accidents : investigation methodology
• IATG 12.10 – Ammunition on multi-national operations
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3.8 NATIONAL STANDARDS FRAMEWORK
Having agreed that the national standards for safety and security of ammunition
and explosives will be set out in a logical order, or framework, it makes sense to
ensure that they make reference to other legislation or standards by having links to
them. This simplifies the national standards, which do not have to be continuously
updated when other relevant legislation changes.

As the national standards will be a normative and legally binding document, they
should reflect local laws and context but also conform to the IATG. Against this
background, cutting and pasting from the IATG does not work. Hence the writers
assigned with the task of drafting national standards should read each “critical and
achievable IATG module”, write down what that IATG module and already existent
local regulations say on the topic and create a list of “minimum requirements” for
the national standard to-be.
Framework for gradual improvement
Every State must balance its use of resources against competing requirements,
and ammunition and explosives safety management is no exception. As such, it
is often not possible to achieve all the aims of the safety and security strategy at
once but to spread these aims over time in a graduated manner to improve safety
and security, thereby reducing risk in the process. What is required is a national
framework to define and manage the various elements of the complex systems
that are necessary to achieve the State’s goals. This framework must incorporate
not only the technical elements but the political and economic needs of the State.
The IATG are a framework for the gradual improvement of ammunition and explosives
safety practices, i.e. the technical elements of the graduated response. This is
borne out in the way that the tasks and processes necessary for safe, efficient and
effective stockpile management are graded against the three RRPLs throughout
the IATG. These RRPLs are outlined in IATG 01.20. 26)
The national authority can identify the State’s technical requirements by conducting
an IATG-based RRPL baseline study and advising the legislature on the results, whilst
making recommendations about how to plug any gaps effectively and efficiently.
When the framework for gradual improvement is in place, the national authority
has the role of subsequent audit and progress reporting.
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Establishing minimum requirements

National ownership
The national authority can only go so far without complete national ownership
over ammunition and explosives safety and security. Small Arms Survey outlines a
model 27) for the ammunition life cycle (figure 7) to explain the structural and functional
elements of ammunition management :
Figure 7 – Small Arms Survey LCMA Model
• Political – the structural element necessary for effectiveness of the functional
elements ; and
• Technical – the functional elements necessary for the management of ammunition
across its life cycle.

03 — National Standards Development Process

Disposal
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National ownership implies that a State takes full responsibility for through-life
management of ammunition, as demonstrated by national authorities’ active engagement in the development, implementation and oversight of a system and the
provision of adequate financial and other resources to support its implementation.
National ownership is a precondition for and is fostered by enabling conditions.
This is a normative framework comprising laws, regulations and standing operating
procedures to govern the system ; an organizational framework for coordination,
oversight and implementation of the system ; infrastructure and equipment to
operationalize the system ; and human resources to implement and maintain related
processes and activities.
| 40

Coherence and consistency in national standards
Assuming that the State issues national standards for ammunition and explosives
safety and security as well as regulations for weapons, the two sets of national standards
must be coherent, i.e. marked by an orderly, logical and aesthetically consistent
relation of parts, and be consistent, i.e. not self-contradictory. It is also important for
the national standards to be coherent and consistent with any other safety-related
legislation and standards.

Prior to 1910, there was no federal-level law, standard, or table in the US that specified
required safe separation distances from or between explosives storage sites.The
development of such criteria resulted from the concerns of the American Railway
Association. At that time, there were many instances where explosives storage
magazines had been built so close to railroads that they represented a hazard to
passengers should an explosion occur at the time a train was passing. A special
committee was appointed by the Association of Manufacturers of Powder and High
Explosives (founded in 1906) to study the problem.The committee reviewed data from
over one hundred notable explosions involving explosive quantities from 200 pounds
(91 kg) to 875,000 pounds (396,893 kg).The result of their efforts was the development
of an AmericanTable of Distances (ATD, 1910), which gave specific, protective distances
to be applied from explosives storage magazines to inhabited buildings, public
highways and public railways. In 1913, the Institute of Makers of Explosives adopted the
table, and the ATD became the accepted standard in the US. 28)
Author : Eric J. Deschambault.
Source : Unpublished background paper.
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Box 4 – United States protective distances criteria adoption
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Box 5 – A
 ccident leading to American Table of Distances (ATD) adoption by the military
and origination of the Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB)
An explosives accident on 10 July 1926, from a lightning strike to an above-ground
magazine, occurred at Lake Denmark Naval Ammunition Depot, New Jersey (located
adjacent to Picatinny Arsenal and 3½ miles from Dover, NJ).The initial explosion event
propagated to additional explosives storage sites.This accident destroyed the depot,
also causing heavy damage to the adjacent Picatinny Arsenal and the surrounding
communities, killing 21 people and injuring 51 others.The monetary loss to the navy
alone was $46 million ($656 million equivalent in 2018). Injuries occurred out to a
distance of three miles and window breakage extended out to 5 miles.This event caused
widespread concern and indignation among the public about the practice of building
arsenals and storing dangerous explosives near populous communities. In response,
the 70th US Congress directed that the Secretaries of War and Navy prepare a report on
the subject of ammunition storage conditions. A Joint Board on Ammunition, consisting
of four military officers, was assigned “to conduct a survey of points of supplies of
ammunition and components thereof for use of the Army and Navy…” In their report,
the Board recommended the adoption of the New Jersey explosives law, which had
incorporated the ATD as its standard of safety. Ultimately this recommendation was
accepted by the US Congress, which also suggested that a permanent board representing
the army and navy be established, resulting in the formation of the Joint Army Navy
Munitions Board in August 1928.This Board used the ATD as its guide for the application
of safe separation distances.The Joint Board eventually evolved into the DoD Explosives
Safety Board (DDESB), which exists today and has the responsibility for developing
Department of Defense Explosives Safety criteria. 29)
Author : Eric J. Deschambault.
Source : Unpublished background paper.

Format and numbering of national standards chapters
National standards chapters must be numbered for ease of reference for all users.
The numbering system should allow for updates if the State does not re-issue
regulations after each change.
The format of national standards should be aligned with the expectations of national
legislation but simplified to ensure understanding and ease of use. Clarity is a
vital characteristic and this simplification should make the contents clear without
compromising the meaning and importance.The set of national standards, and each
individual standard, should have a logical structure and use common terminology,
presented in plain language unless a technical term is required, in which case a
glossary should be provided.
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States applying the IATG should consider using the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) 30) format that has been used to write the IATG and other
international standards and guidelines such as the Modular Small-arms-control
International Compendium (MOSAIC), 31) Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization
and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), 32) and International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS). 33) ISO is a worldwide federation of national bodies from over 140 states.
Its work results in international agreements, which are published as ISO standards
and guides. A list of ISO standards and guides is given in the ISO Catalogue. 34)
Relationship between legislation, national standards and SOPs

The national authority produces and authorizes the national standards to comply
with the national legislation and to effectively deal with the operations of the
explosives sector. Subject to the confirmation of the legislature, the standards
are amendable by the national authority, which may consult with experts from the
State’s explosives sector and/or international organizations for advice on what is best
for the State’s needs and requirements.
Standing operating procedures (SOPs) are the documents that describe how the
legislation and national standards will be practically implemented at the local level.
SOPs are typically written by relevant technical experts on behalf of the director or
commander of a facility. Competent SOPs naturally flow from national standards,
which stem from corresponding legislation, however, the adoption of international
norms might affect this legislation. Therefore, in writing a national standard, it is
necessary to know how to adapt it to the local context, existing political and legal
processes and systems to accommodate the upcoming national standards, and
how to facilitate their amendment later on.

43 |

03 — National Standards Development Process

Policy and regulations are enacted by the legislature, forming the overarching
framework for the governance of the safety and security of the State’s ammunition
and explosives sector.

04

MANAGEMENT
AND REVIEW
OF NATIONAL
STANDARDS

This chapter aims to provide the national authority or individual that is responsible
for the creation and upkeep of national standards, with guidance on the day-to-day
management and the formal and informal review of these standards in keeping
with internationally accepted good practice.

4.1	TRANSLATING THE IATG RISK REDUCTION PROCESS LEVELS INTO
NATIONAL STANDARDS

It is widely understood that all States will adopt a risk-based approach to the management of ammunition and explosives stockpiles and the IATG are written so that
States or individual ammunition facilities can conduct their activities in a relatively
safe manner. Relatively, in this context, means that the State or facility commanders
understand the degree of risk that they are willing to accept when implementing
national practices and procedures. IATG 02.10 36) provides a good introduction to
understanding risk management.

4.2	AUDIT AND MONITORING OF PROGRESS TOWARDS
NATIONAL RRPL GOALS
Having set out how the State will conduct its ammunition and explosives safety
activities in national standards, the national authority will be expected to provide
assurance to the legislature (and possibly to international bodies) that the various
facilities are operating in compliance with the national standards. The national
authority will, in most cases, be responsible to the legislature for national progress in achieving the national ammunition and explosives safety strategy and the
achievement of the specified RRPL.
To ensure that processes work, they must be audited, the results assessed, a gap
analysis carried out and an improvement action plan created. Carrying out audits
and monitoring compliance areas and procedures are essential business functions
and must be a regulatory requirement.
The objectives of audit reviews are different from monitoring and auditing : monitoring
ensures that policies and procedures are in place and are being followed ; and auditing
determines whether the monitoring programme is operating as it should and that
policies, procedures and controls adopted are adequate, and their effectiveness
is validated in reducing errors and risks.
Monitoring is the programme manager’s responsibility. This is the person most
familiar with their own operations and they should be charged with identifying
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National standards are created and owned by the State, as reflected in the guiding
principles of the IATG. 35) The IATG are comprehensive in their content but they
recognize that States have many competing priorities for their finite resources.

risk areas which are their responsibility, developing appropriate internal controls,
policies and procedures, and monitoring them to verify they are being followed.
Auditing of these operations needs to be performed by parties independent of
these operations. This will ensure objectivity in performing the audit reviews.
Why monitoring and auditing is an important safety process
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It can be argued that many of the major unplanned explosions at munitions sites 37)
are a result of poor compliance with safety procedures and that they might not have
occurred if the sites had been subject to rigorous monitoring and audit. It seems
to be self-evident that if a stockpile is deteriorating and that this is discovered in an
audit of procedures or inspection of the site, then action to reduce or eliminate the
risk from the deteriorating stock can be taken.
IATG 06.70 38) – Inspection of explosives facilities - explains the rationale behind the
requirement for a thorough inspection regime in explosives areas and recommended
procedures. It is imperative that all aspects of the explosives licence, and the
national authority explosives regulatory regime, are being complied with and that
explosives facilities are fit for purpose. Compliance with the terms of the explosives
licence should be a mandatory requirement with exceptions approved only by the
national authority.
The national standards for monitoring and auditing of ammunition and explosivesrelated activities should explain the role(s) of the national authority and inspectorate
units, their chain of authority and links to the legislature, any links to law enforcement
agencies, any cross-governmental responsibilities, and any links to international
organizations or groups. The national standards should also include detail of how
licences for storage, use, processing, movement and disposal of ammunition and
explosives will be submitted, approved, monitored and audited.The national standards
will, out of necessity, also remind users of the sanctions available to the legislature
and national authority for non-compliance.

4.3	NATIONAL STANDARDS AS PART OF CAPACITY AND
CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT
The acts of drafting, approving, implementing and ensuring compliance with one’s
own national standards encourages understanding. The States which introduce
and/or enact their own national standards are likely to make better use of them than
States trying to enact similar national standards from elsewhere, if only because
they can say “these are our rules”.
Capacity development is the process by which individuals, groups and organizations,
institutions and States develop, enhance and organize their systems, resources and
knowledge ; all reflected in their abilities, individually and collectively, to perform
functions, solve problems and achieve objectives.
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A national authority demonstrates its understanding of the activities it undertakes
through the documents it produces. High-quality, detailed but understandable
national standards are important to the users and of great interest to potential
international and regional partners.
The Australian Department of Defence defines capability development 39) as “the
capacity or ability to achieve an operational effect. An operational effect may be
defined or described in terms of the nature of the effect and of how, when, where
and for how long it is produced.” The operational effect that is delivered in this case
is a stockpile of ammunition and explosives that is not only safe and secure but
sustainable and ready for use at all times.

One of the national standards should describe the State’s governance structure for
the safe and secure management of ammunition and explosives. No doubt some
or all of this will be included in legislation/regulations but the national standards should
provide the user with an understanding of how they fit into the structure.
Legislature
In the context of ammunition and explosives safety management, the role of the
legislature is to pass laws for the manufacture, storage, processing, movement,
testing, use and disposal of ammunition and explosives. The legislature typically :
• Drafts and enacts ammunition and explosives safety and security legislation ;
• Ensures that national standards comply with the legislation before approval
for use ;
• Supported by advice from the national authority, publishes the national action plan
or ammunition and explosives safety and security strategy based on internationally
accepted good practice ;
• Provides the necessary resources to achieve the aims and milestones of the
ammunition and explosives safety and security strategy.
The IATG provide technical guidance on how the manufacture, storage, processing,
movement, testing, use and disposal of ammunition and explosives is conducted
in practice but the laws need to be written such that they include other details such
as who can be licenced to handle explosive substances and articles, where and
how these licences are issued, and who will enforce the laws and sanctions for
those who break the laws. The State might need to acquire land on which to build
ammunition and explosives facilities, and to safeguard land surrounding explosives
facilities from encroachment by building developments, all of which will require
appropriate legislation.
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4.4	ROLES FOR NATIONAL MANAGEMENT, OPERATING AND
AUDITING BODIES

National authority
IATG 01.40 defines the national authority as “the government department(s), organisation(s) or institution(s) charged with the regulation, management, co-ordination
and operation of conventional ammunition stockpile management activities”. It is
good practice to separate the regulatory body from the operational organization(s)
as can be seen from the following sections. The national authority :

04 — Management and review of national standards

• Drafts and implements national standards ;
• Advises the legislature on the scope and scale of the ammunition and explosives
issues to be addressed ;
• Advises the legislature on which internationally accepted good practices are in the
best interest of the State and the resources necessary to achieve the aims of the
national action plan or ammunition and explosives safety and security strategy ;
• Audits the operating bodies, be they government or civil entities, to provide
assurance to the legislature of the degree of compliance with the national standards,
to identify gaps and advise on short- to medium-term goals to fill any gaps.
Regulatory body
The primary goal for a regulatory body is to protect the public, such as providing
and enforcing adequate standards for health and safety in an organization. Unlike
professional organizations, which require regulating, a regulatory body is created
on the basis of a legal mandate or legislation. These regulatory bodies are funded
by levies taken from their professions and have their own staff and premises.
Examples of explosives regulatory bodies are the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board
(DDESB), and the UK’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and Defence Safety
Authority (DSA).
Operational organization
Some States appoint one or more department(s) of State to be the only organization
that can manage the safe and secure handling and use of ammunition and explosives.
Others allow commercial organizations to do this. Whichever model or self-designed
construct is used, the role of an operational ammunition and explosives organization
is to conduct all its activities within the law.
The government and/or civil ammunition and explosives operators such as depots,
disposal and demilitarization facilities, manufacturers, companies and quarries :
• Draft and implement standing operating procedures (SOPs) that direct their staff
and guide their work in conformity to the national standards ;
• Conduct their activities and maintain records as required by the national standards ;
• Provide reports to the national authority and prepare to be audited as required.
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Auditing organization

In States with large security forces, it is not uncommon for the operational organization(s) to have its own auditing body or individuals with an audit function on the staff
of explosives facilities. Their role is to provide the commander of a facility or the
head of the operational organization with assurance that they are compliant with all
relevant regulations. This explosives safety representative is usually an experienced
ammunition manager or ammunition inspector who is not employed in the day-to-day
activities of the facility and who reports directly to the head/commander.
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As the regulator, the national authority is expected to have an organization within
its structure that carries out audits of ammunition and explosives facilities. The role
of this “inspectorate” is captured in the description of an ammunition inspector in
IATG 01.90 40) to “…audit the policy and technical instructions for all aspects of the
stockpile management of ammunition and explosive substances and articles”.This
will involve inspectors visiting facilities, observing all the activities that are undertaken
there, completing an RRPL checklist, making note of all good and poor practices,
reporting on his/her findings to the national authority and taking appropriate actions.

05

CONCLUSION

By developing its own set of standards, a national authority will gain greater understanding of all aspects of ammunition management.The application of good practice
from the IATG and other relevant guidance to national standards will enhance
the knowledge of the authors of these standards. This local understanding and
knowledge are essential in the capacity development of the State’s ability to manage
its own ammunition in the long-term.

To be effective, the national standards will need to take into account the current state
of ammunition and available resources. Competent implementation of adequate
national standards will enable a State to attain the goal of safe and secure management
of ammunition.This guide and the IATG will assist the national authority in achieving
this goal.
The national authority responsible for management of the national ammunition
and explosives stockpile is best placed to deliver national standards. It will have
the relevant competencies to be able to adapt the IATG to national requirements.
The national action plan or strategy will specify if the State will adopt the IATG as
its basis for compliance with international norms.
The IATG and other international norms recognize the absolute right of States to
legislate for the safety and security of their people. Only at the national level can
the scope and scale of ammunition and explosives safety and security issues be
addressed. For it is at this level that the State-specific political, economic, cultural,
educational, security and structural issues of the management of military and civil
explosives stockpiles can be identified.
National standards will embrace not only the technical aspects of stockpile management
but also the legal framework within which authorization to manufacture, acquire,
keep, process, use and dispose of ammunition and explosives is managed, along
with the range of sanctions for non-compliance.
The establishment of effective and well-coordinated national standards is a
concrete signal that ammunition management is nationally owned.
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As described in Chapter 3, States should not attempt to achieve risk reduction to
RRPL 3 immediately. Instead, an assessment of the current situation should be
completed and then a risk assessment carried out. The national standards should
reflect the outcome of these assessments and describe a realistic approach to the
safe and secure management of ammunition with the assets available currently
and in the future, with a natural progression through RRPL 1 and RRPL 2.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DESCRIPTIONS
National authority

The government department(s), organisation(s) or
institution(s) charged with the regulation, management,
coordination and operation of ammunition stockpile
management activities.

IATG 01.40

National standard

A documented agreement containing technical
specifications or other precise criteria to be used
consistently as rules, guidelines, or definitions of
characteristics to ensure that materials, products,
processes and services are fit for their purpose.
A national standard therefore brings together the
technical, legislative and regulatory requirements of
the State into a set of nationally accepted norms that
are available to, understood by, and achievable (within
accepted boundaries) by all those affected.

IATG 01.40

Standing
operating
procedure (SOP)

Instructions that define the preferred or currently
established method of conducting an operational task
or activity, noting that their purpose is to promote
recognisable and measurable degrees of discipline,
uniformity, consistency and commonality within an
organisation, with the aim of improving operational
effectiveness and safety. SOPs should reflect local
requirements and circumstances.

IATG 01.40

Risk

Combination of the probability of occurrence of harm
and the severity of that harm.

IATG 01.40

Risk analysis

Systematic use of available information to identify
hazards and to estimate the risk.

IATG 01.40

Risk assessment

The overall process comprising a risk analysis and a risk
evaluation. The objective evaluation of risk in a manner
in which assumptions and uncertainties are clearly
considered and presented.

IATG 01.40

Risk management

The complete risk-based decision-making process.

IATG 01.40

Risk reduction

Actions taken to lessen the probability, negative
consequences or both, associated with a particular risk.

IATG 01.40
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Basic safety precautions are in place to reduce the risk
of undesirable explosive events during ammunition
storage, but fatalities and injuries to individuals in local
civilian communities may still occur.

IATG 01.40

Risk reduction
process level 2

Safety precautions, in the form of appropriate separation
and quantity distances, have been implemented to
reduce the risk of fatalities and injuries to individuals
within local communities to a tolerable level.

IATG 01.40

Risk reduction
process level 3

A safe, secure, effective and efficient conventional
ammunition stockpile management system is in place
that is fully in line with international best practices.

IATG 01.40
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Risk reduction
process level 1
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ANNEX I : BRIEF SUMMARIES OF IATG MODULES
This table briefly summarizes the 45 modules in the 12 thematic IATG volumes, to
assist the development of national standards. 41)
Table 4 – Brief summaries of IATG modules to assist the development of national standards
IATG Volume 01 – Introduction and Principles of Ammunition Management
This module introduces the six activity groups that encompass conventional
ammunition stockpile management and identifies four guiding principles of the IATG :
• the right of national governments to apply national standards to their national stockpile ;
• the need to protect those most at risk from unintended explosive events ;
• the requirement to build a national capacity to develop, maintain and apply
appropriate standards for stockpile management ; and
• the need to maintain consistency and compliance with other international norms,
conventions and agreements.
By applying the IATG risk management process in line with their capabilities and
resources, States and other users are expected to secure immediate reductions
in ammunition-related risk. More broadly, use of the IATG is designed to ensure
consistency with international guidelines and compliance with relevant international
regulations, conventions and treaties.
Module 01.20
Index of risk
reduction
process levels
(RRPL) within
IATG

The RRPLs lie at the heart of the IATG risk management process. Each required task
and activity is assigned to one of three possible levels. As the level number increases,
the risks decrease accordingly. Under RRPL 1, basic stockpile safety and security
precautions are in place and a minimal investment of resources is required. The risk
of unplanned explosions at munitions site (UEMS) remains, as does the concomitant
likelihood of fatalities and injuries. RRPL 2 is an improvement on RRPL 1 and requires
medium-level investment. The risk of UEMS remains, but the likelihood of fatalities and
injuries is reduced due to the use of basic separation distances. RRPL 3 requires the
greatest investment. The result is a relatively safe, secure and efficient stockpile that is
consistent with international best practice. States that adopt the IATG risk management
structure are able to develop, manage and monitor their own efforts towards achieving
self-assigned RRPL goals. Using the tables presented in this module, a State can design
its own comprehensive plan for achieving IATG compliance.

Module 01.30
Policy
development
and advice

A comprehensive national ammunition management programme that ensures the
safe and secure storage of ammunition requires top-level support for State policies
that specify requirements for the system. Before policies can be established, policy
developers and decision makers must gain an understanding of the overarching
philosophy and principles of safe, effective, and efficient ammunition storage, as
well as the associated challenges. International agreements may have an impact on
national policy and direction, and stockpile management.
This module is designed to assist States as they develop strategic ammunition
management policy and requirements. It outlines important functional areas that need
to be addressed by policy-makers and relevant organizations at all levels of national
planning and operational activities. Efficient stockpile management ensures the best
“value for money” from ammunition. Stockpile management is an effective mechanism
for reducing security risks associated with loss, theft, leakage and proliferation.
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Module 01.10
Guide to the
International
Ammunition
Technical
Guidelines
(IATG)

IATG Volume 01 – Introduction and Principles of Ammunition Management
The IATG draw on a variety of international sources. To ensure a common understanding
and consistency in interpretation and application, this module defines all key terms that are
used in the IATG modules. In addition, it explains the top–down approach that was taken by
the IATG drafting team in developing the IATG terms and definitions.

Module 01.50
UN explosive
hazard
classification
system and
codes

The development of appropriate ammunition safety requirements calls for an
understanding of the risks associated with each individual ammunition item. In
general, a technical authority in the State where the ammunition is produced assigns
an item’s dangerous goods classification, using prescribed UN testing and assessment
protocols. The classification identifies the item’s hazard class, division, and storage
compatibility code, all of which are necessary for shipping and storage purposes.
With rare exceptions, purchased and shipped ammunition should be classified in
accordance with the UN protocols described in this module. For storage purposes and
to ensure the proper application of quantity distances, a relevant technical authority
may need to assign ammunition to a storage subdivision and to further classify its
predominant hazardous effects. Since the IATG risk management process and its
safety requirements are based on UN hazard classifications, it is important for users
to have a basic understanding of what these are, how they are derived, and how they
should be applied.

Attachments

Module 01.40
Glossary
of terms,
definitions and
abbreviations

This module introduces and explains the UN system and related codes, identifies
the tests that are performed to determine an appropriate hazard classification, and
discusses the mixing of ammunition with different compatibility groups. It also
covers the assignment of an appropriate storage subdivision when relevant. National
authorities can ensure the proper application of IATG requirements once they have
integrated the UN hazard classification system into their through-life management
processes.
Module 01.60
Ammunition
faults and
performance
failures

Despite efforts to promote stockpile safety, UEMS may still occur. Most of these
events are preventable, however, and their impact can be reduced significantly if
preventive LCMA safety measures are undertaken.
This module outlines what steps to take in the case of ammunition faults or
performance failures. It explains the importance and benefits of reporting such
problems, investigating them thoroughly, and taking prompt corrective action to
prevent them from reoccurring.
The ability to manage ammunition faults and performance failures is an important
part of ensuring the safety and security of a national stockpile. This module advises
authorities on how to develop a national process for reporting, investigating, correcting
and managing these failures.
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IATG Volume 01 – Introduction and Principles of Ammunition Management
Module 01.70
Bans and
constraints

States should never permit the storage or use of ammunition that is dangerous or
unsafe. Similarly, they should not use ammunition that does not meet minimum
performance requirements or is in short supply.
This module provides guidance on the establishment of a formal system of bans and
constraints. It also covers their application to ammunition use, storage, handling,
transportation and disposal. It explains why bans and constraints might be used, how to
manage them, and how to make sure all relevant parties are aware of their existence and
abide by them. The ability to manage ammunition bans and constraints is an important
part of the through-life management of ammunition. This module helps authorities to
develop a national process for establishing, implementing and managing them.
Module 01.50 explains the UN hazard classification system and codes in the context of
IATG risk management and safety requirements. It helps users to understand the hazardous
effects of ammunition and explosives, as well as how to protect against them.
The type and extent of hazardous effects associated with UEMS is related to the kind
and quantity of ammunition and explosives involved in an incident, as well as the
location in which it occurs. Proper risk management calls for a solid understanding of
all possible hazards.
This module is designed for technical officials who require an understanding of the
effects and consequences of explosives and who need to undertake risk assessments,
which are an RRPL 1 requirement. Risk assessments help to identify the potential impact
of an unexpected event on surrounding areas and personnel. When minimum IATG
separation distances cannot be met, risk assessments and risk analyses are also RRPL
2 and RRPL 3 requirements (see Module 2.20). By understanding hazardous effects,
technical experts will be better able to advise decision makers on available options for
reducing, preventing and even eliminating risk.

Module 01.90
Ammunition
management
personnel
competences

To assure the safety and security of a State’s ammunition stockpile, personnel charged
with handling and managing ammunition must be properly trained and demonstrate
minimum competency levels. As there are no international standards on the skill
sets required for proper ammunition and risk management, this module provides an
overview of the required basic competencies. It is focused on RRPL 2 and RRPL 3 of the
IATG requirements.
The module describes three areas that are associated with personnel competencies :
behavioural traits, technical skills, and the achievement of targets and objectives. It
also identifies seven generic categories of ammunition-related personnel and explains
how to assess an individual’s competency to perform assigned tasks. For each of the
generic personnel categories, detailed annexes identify roles and responsibilities,
competencies and IATG tasks for which personnel must be able to demonstrate
proficiency. Ensuring that personnel are properly trained and competent is an important
part of Through Life Management. This module assists authorities in developing a
national training and competency programme for personnel involved in ammunitionrelated tasks and their management.
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Module 01.80
Formulae for
ammunition
management

IATG Volume 02 – Risk Management

Attachments

Module 02.10
Introduction
to risk
management
principles and
processes

Based on their resources and capacities, States take various approaches to risk
management, ranging from basic to extremely complex. For those with limited
resources, capacity and capabilities, even simple risk management techniques and
tools can help to identify risks related to UEMS so that decision makers clearly
understand the risks they are accepting and the consequences of their decisions.
Implementation of a robust, effective and integrated risk management process for
achieving an “acceptable” risk level for ammunition-related activities should be a
fundamental part of a State’s through-life management process.
This module discusses the concept, principles, activities, and techniques pertaining to
risk management of ammunition storage, as well as available IATG tools (provided by
SaferGuard) to support risk management efforts. Adherence to IATG requirements calls
for the implementation of many components of an integrated risk management system.
Although this module is primarily focused on risks to the local civilian population, it
provides information that can be used to address risks involving all functional areas
of ammunition stockpile management. The module describes straightforward risk
assessment techniques that can be used in a wide range of circumstances. It also
provides references for more complex risk assessment and analysis.

Module 02.20
Quantity and
separation
distances

The use of separation distance - that is, quantity distance as detailed in this module
- is the most effective way to protect people and structures from the impact of UEMS,
which can produce weapon fragments, thermal radiation and structural debris. Under
ideal circumstances, a safe separation distance is determined and applied. In practice,
this step is often skipped due to a lack of resources or capacity ; in such cases,
authorities make do with a distance that ensures an “acceptable” level of risk.
This module underscores the importance and value of complying with IATG
requirements in determining minimum quantity distances from potential explosion
sites. It provides pre-determined distances that are based on the exposed site,
ammunition type and quantity, and storage sites - in the open air or within a structure.

Module 02.30
Licensing of
explosives
facilities

This module addresses licensing of explosives facilities. It identifies issuing
authorities, the various types of licences, the minimum content of such licences,
and related management and oversight responsibilities to ensure that licensing
requirements are met. The explosives allowance specified in a licence should be
based on the results of a risk assessment or analysis and associated risk management
decisions (see Module 02.10), by use of the quantity distance tables (see Module
02.20), and/or an approved site plan (see Module 05.10). The guidance provided in this
module can assist authorities in developing a national licensing system for ammunition
facilities and their management.
The safety distances and the net explosive quantity described in Module 02.20 are
recorded on an explosive limit licence (ELL) for each explosive storehouse or facility.
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IATG Volume 02 – Risk Management
Module 02.40
Safeguarding
of explosives
facilities

A guiding IATG principle is that national authorities have a responsibility to protect
those most at risk from UEMS (see Module 01.10). One of the most effective ways of
protecting the public from such an event is by using the quantity distances provided in
Module 02.20.
All too often, these quantity distances extend beyond the boundaries of ammunition
sites, including into areas that are not under the control of national authorities, such
as private property. The process for managing, protecting, and restricting the use
of such land is called “safeguarding”. In the absence of a system for safeguarding
land located within designated boundaries, the public can be at risk. Such cases
contravene approved quantity distances or decisions on an “acceptable” level of risk
from explosives facilities (Module 02.10). A lack of safeguarding can have a significant
impact on public safety as well as a State’s ammunition capabilities and its stockpile.

Module 02.50
Fire safety

Fire presents a significant threat to ammunition stockpiles and is probably the most
common cause of UEMS. In view of the inherent risks associated with ammunition, fire
presents an immediate and high risk to life and property surrounding a stockpile.
For this reason, an aggressive and comprehensive fire prevention programme is
essential to minimize the risk of fires in or near ammunition storage facilities. In
addition, trained personnel, response processes and equipment for fighting fires must
be in place and readily available. Once a fire gets out of control and ammunition begins
to react, the evacuation of all personnel to a safe distance is generally required.
This module addresses the elements of a good fire safety and prevention programme
for explosives facilities. It also outlines the basic principles underpinning firefighting
in such facilities and provides guidance on firefighting equipment, systems and
procedures. It is not intended to help design firefighting systems or responses, as these
must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
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This module discusses the concept of safeguarding and provides an approach for
establishing, implementing and managing a safeguarding system. Authorities can use
this guidance to develop policy and requirements for safeguarding land surrounding
ammunition stockpiles.

IATG Volume 03 – Ammunition Accounting
Module 03.10
Inventory
management

Ammunition has a shelf life that is finite and controlled by a number of internal and
external factors. Unmanaged and unmonitored ammunition can be stolen, damaged
or misused and can deteriorate to a point where it reacts in an unintended manner.
To protect such a valuable commodity and provide a safe and secure environment, a
State must be able to account for – and effectively manage – its ammunition as part
of an inventory management system. This module details the basic elements of such a
system and how to incorporate it into an ammunition management programme. Failure
to provide basic inventory management is almost a guarantee that ammunition will fail
to function as designed, will become unsafe, or will be diverted.

Attachments

An inventory management process can help a State to meet the IATG guiding principles
by ensuring that only ammunition that is serviceable and safe to use is issued and thus
protect the civilian population from hazards associated with unsafe ammunition (see
Module 01.10). An effective inventory management system allows a state to identify
inventory issues – including inaccuracy, loss, theft and unsafe ammunition in the
national stockpile – and is an essential part of through-life management.
Module 03.20
Lotting and
batching

Tracking lot and batch numbers on ammunition as part of the inventory management
process supports a State’s efforts towards efficient ammunition management. Lotting
and batching distinguishes like stockpile items that were manufactured at the same
time using the same or similar materials and processes, meaning that they are
generally expected to have the same performance capacity and properties throughout
their lifetime.
This module introduces the concept of lotting and batching, describes when lot and
batch numbers should be used, how they are assigned, and what information can be
derived from a lot or batch number. It also addresses the importance of knowing and
tracking ammunition locations by lot and batch numbers. A primary benefit of recording
and tracking such information, as well as ammunition locations (by lot and batch), is
the ability to identify and locate unsafe or suspect ammunition so that appropriate
action can be taken to manage risk (see Module 01.70).
Accounting for lotting and batching information as part of the national ammunition
inventory management system is important for proper stockpile accounting and
through-life management. These processes improve a State’s ability to keep
ammunition safe and secure.
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This module provides guidance on the development and implementation of effective
national controls over international ammunition transfers, including the import, export,
transit, transshipment and brokering of ammunition. It also addresses issues related
to the transfer of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), the enforcement
of controls, international cooperation and assistance, and public and parliamentary
transparency. This module is of particular relevance to States that are significant
exporters or importers of ammunition but that have little involvement in other aspects
of the international arms trade. The module may also be of interest to legislators,
ammunition manufacturers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other
stakeholders working to improve controls.
The module focuses on assisting government personnel, UN officials, and staff from
other international and regional organizations that are developing and implementing
ammunition transfer controls. It covers the development and strengthening of national
controls to help prevent transfers that fuel armed conflict, abuses of human rights or
violations of international humanitarian law, or risk being excessive or destabilizing
to the recipient country. It also offers advice concerning the development of effective
national measures to prosecute individuals who breach ammunition transfer norms.
Module 03.40
End-user and
end-use of
internationally
transferred
ammunition
module

This module provides guidance for the development and implementation of effective
national controls over the end-users and end-uses of internationally transferred
ammunition, specifically in order to prevent and combat its diversion from the legal
market into the illicit sphere. Other aspects of the international transfer of ammunition
are covered in Module 03.30.

Module 03.50
Tracing of
ammunition

This module aims to build national capacity for the tracing of ammunition in order
to identify and disrupt sources of illicit trade linked to armed conflict and criminal
activity. Illicit ammunition - which tends to enter the illicit sphere following legal
manufacture - fuels conflict and crime. Ammunition components are commonly used to
produce improvised explosive devices. Tracing is used to determine the point at which
ammunition was diverted or became illicit. It involves the systematic tracking of items
from the point of manufacture or import, through the supply chain, to the last legal owner.
Lotting and batching help to ensure that ammunition is traceable (see Module 03.20).

This module covers legislative and other processes that can be used to control the endusers and end-uses, including the assessment of diversion risks at the licensing stage ;
the establishment and use of end-use documentation ; the authentication and verification
of end-use documentation ; and post-delivery monitoring of transferred ammunition. It
also addresses enforcement mechanisms and international cooperation and assistance.
The primary targets of this module are national authorities responsible for devising and
implementing ammunition transfer controls. This module is also relevant to legislators,
ammunition manufacturers, NGOs and other stakeholders working to improve controls.
National controls of end-users and end-uses are part of a comprehensive system that
encompasses all aspects of ammunition transfer. The basic characteristics of such a
system are : legislation or a regulatory framework ; procedures for the assessment of
diversion risks at the licensing stage ; end-user authentication ; verification measures
before, during, and after the transfer ; and enforcement mechanisms.

This module covers areas such as the introduction of national points of contact, the
establishment of a national tracing system, domestic and international tracing operations,
responses to international tracing requests, and international cooperation and assistance,
including the roles of INTERPOL, the UN, regional organizations and NGOs.
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Module 03.30
International
transfer of
ammunition
module

IATG Volume 04 – Explosives Facilities (Storage) (Field and Temporary Conditions)

Attachments

Module 04.10
Field storage

During military operations, there is often a need to store ammunition in the field
(“open storage”) if proper storage facilities are unavailable at deployment locations.
Ammunition in open storage can be kept safely, effectively and efficiently as long as
certain safety challenges are resolved.
This module addresses open storage of ammunition for periods of up to one year
in support of military operations, describes the challenges associated with such
“short-term” storage, and details specific requirements for managing and monitoring
the ammunition. Open storage is associated with significant safety concerns,
including the deteriorating effect of exposure to wind, water, sun, heat, humidity,
sand and dust, as well as the possibility that the service life of ammunition may be
significantly reduced by exposure. A surveillance and in-service test programme is
required to ensure that ammunition performance and safety are not compromised
during, or as a result of, short-term open storage (see Module 07.20). This module
assumes that deployment activities will end within one year and that ammunition
deemed safe for transport will be returned to its originating State. Module 04.20
provides guidance for deployments that exceed one year and involve long-term open
storage of ammunition.

Module 04.20
Temporary
storage

Long-term open storage may be required for up to five years if appropriate depot
storage infrastructure is not available, or if available infrastructure cannot offer the
necessary protection from the elements. This module assumes that the situation
that led to the need for long-term open storage will be eliminated or resolved within
five years, either because appropriate new infrastructure will become available or
because the ammunition will have been used, relocated or demilitarized. Even under
long-term open storage, it is possible for ammunition to be stored safely, effectively
and efficiently, as long as significant safety and security challenges are resolved.
This module describes these challenges and details specific requirements for
managing and monitoring ammunition in this environment. Concerns regarding
safety and reliability are further amplified for long-term open storage due to the
increased exposure time. An effective surveillance and in-service test programme
is the only way to ensure that ammunition performance and safety are not
compromised during, or as a result of, long-term open storage (see Module 07.20).
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IATG Volume 05 – Explosives Facilities (Storage) (Infrastructure and Equipment)
Module 05.10
Planning
and siting of
explosives
facilities

UEMS can have extremely dangerous effects on the surrounding area. Authorities
must consider these potential effects as early as possible in the planning and design
of an explosives facility of any size or capacity. They also need to factor them into
their assessments of protection needs around these facilities, such as in relation to
the public, roads, buildings or other storage facilities.
Every existing or planned explosives facility must be carefully considered and
evaluated to ensure that minimum quantity distances are applied (see Module
02.20). Whenever these cannot be applied, appropriate risk assessment and
risk acceptance steps must be taken (see Module 02.10). These actions can be
accomplished through the establishment of a formal national process to assess,
site, and approve all existing and planned explosives facilities. The primary purpose
of this process is to verify that each established and planned ammunition storage
location meets IATG requirements in addition to providing minimum protection levels
within quantity distances (see Module 02.20).

Module 05.20
Types of buildings
for explosives
facilities

Attachments

This module details general requirements and procedures for planning, siting and
approving planned and existing explosives facilities and for managing construction
within quantity distances of these facilities.
Many different types of buildings are used for the storage and handling of
ammunition, but - from a safety or risk perspective - not all are appropriate for
the ammunition-related activities conducted in them. The consequences of using
unsuitable buildings can be serious. When planning the construction of a new
explosives facility, decision makers should consider a number of different building
types and aspects of building construction.
This module details the general requirements for the design of explosives facilities.
It discusses the effects of unplanned events, the hazards they introduce, the concept
of explosives propagation (that is, a detonation reaction in which one ammunition
stack causes the immediate detonation reaction of an adjacent stack), and the
importance of protecting against the detonation of an adjacent stack in order to
limit the size of any unplanned event. The module provides guidance on the types of
buildings to be used as explosives facilities ; possible scenarios and effects resulting
from unplanned events and how different types of buildings respond to such
events ; design considerations ; and the optimization of explosives facility design
with quantity distances. Explosives facilities are a hazard to personnel, the public,
surrounding facilities and other exposed locations. Appropriate building design,
construction and siting are of crucial importance in the application of IATG quantity
distances, as detailed in Module 02.20.
Module 05.30
Traverses and
barricades

A properly constructed barricade around an explosives facility is an extremely
effective mitigation technique for intercepting low-angle fragments and debris
resulting from an unplanned explosion. It is important to properly assess the
placement of barricades so that they are constructed where they provide the most
beneficial protection and are most cost-effective.
This module addresses the issues of barricade selection, design, construction and
siting, and only applies to barricades used in permanent explosive storage facilities.
Temporary barricades used as part of open storage are addressed in Modules 04.10
and 04.20.
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Module 05.40
Safety standards
for electrical
installations

The control of electrical and lightning-related hazards in explosives facilities is
important because of the potential for transient electrical signals and surges,
arcing, static discharge and lightning strikes, as well as associated fires. Control
measures for these hazards can vary significantly, depending on the ammunitionrelated operations being performed and the facility involved. Some measures
may be very simple while others may require complex, integrated systems that
must be collectively considered as part of the design of the building’s electrical,
grounding, bonding and lightning protection systems, as well as their installation
and maintenance. A primary technique for managing electrical risks within an
explosives facility is categorizing the facility by electrical hazard codes and zones.
Such categories further define the levels of protection that are required to prevent an
unplanned event.

Attachments

This module helps users to understand the electrical hazard categorization process,
as well as the protection systems that may be required to manage various electrical
threats. It also details the requirements and standards for these systems, including
testing, to demonstrate system effectiveness.
Module 05.50
Vehicles and
mechanical
handling
equipment (MHE)
in explosives
facilities

In the context of ammunition-related operations, unsuitable vehicles and mechanical
handling equipment can present a fire or explosion risk. Vehicles and equipment, as
well as ancillary items, should comply with the facility’s or area’s assigned electrical
hazard categorization codes and zones (see Module 05.40).

Module 05.60
Radio frequency
hazards

Technological advances have resulted in the increased use of communications
equipment operating on a host of different radio frequencies, as well as power
outputs such as data loggers, mobile phones, pagers, two-way radios (hand-held,
permanent, or vehicle-mounted) and high-power transmitters. This equipment
generates electromagnetic radiation energy ; if improperly used in the proximity of
susceptible ammunition, the energy from an inadvertent transmission may cause
an unplanned event or the degradation of an electronic system. The energy can
also lead to arcing or sparking, both of which are potential fire hazards. These
threats point to the need to consider, control and manage the use of electronic
communications equipment in the proximity of ammunition throughout the throughlife management process.

This module addresses a broad range of vehicles and MHE that might be used in
ammunition-related operations and provides corresponding risk reduction measures.
It also reviews requirements for a management and control process for vehicle
equipment design, modification, selection, approval, labeling, use, maintenance
and testing – to ensure the process is appropriate for all intended uses and that it is
kept current with applicable standards. Compliance with this module ensures that
vehicles and MHE used to support ammunition-related operations are appropriate
and safe for their intended use and environment, thereby reducing risk.

This module explains why electromagnetic radiation energy is a hazard that needs
to be addressed as part of ammunition management, and details basic precautions
that can be taken. It provides guidance on the requirements for developing a technical
national authority and statutory regulations, in addition to establishing an assessment
and approval process for the use of electronic communications equipment and
transmitters. Compliance with this module addresses a critical safety issue and helps
prevent UEMS related to uncontrolled electromagnetic radiation energy.
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IATG Volume 06 – Explosives Facilities (Storage) (Operations)
Module 06.10
Control of
explosives
facilities

The safe and efficient management of explosives facilities or operations - with their
myriad hazards - entails the consideration of areas such as personnel training and
qualifications, security and access controls, fire protection, real estate management
and site planning, electronic equipment for communications, facilities and licensing.
From a safety and security perspective, managers, supervisors and ammunitionrelated personnel should prioritize the management and control of activities
associated with the above areas.
This module introduces the basic principles for managing explosives operations. It
lists the elements of a good control and management programme, identifying what
is important about each and providing the requirements for the routine control of
ammunition-related activities. The module covers some technical issues including
radio-frequency energy produced by transmitters, MHE, and electrical installations.
It cites references to other modules that have been developed to help manage these
areas.
Both ammunition and storage facilities are expensive and should be managed
not only to maximize storage facility use, but also to place as much ammunition
as possible in the protective spaces of storage facilities. As Modules 04.10 and
04.20 indicate, covered storage is preferable to open storage for the protection
of ammunition from the potentially damaging effects of environmental and other
exposure.

Attachments

Module 06.20
Storage space
requirements

This module helps users to plan for and optimize ammunition storage, thereby
ensuring maximum cost efficiency and effective storage planning. It encourages
the full use of available units of space in covered storage to reduce the need for
open storage. Explosives limits must not be exceeded in any storage facility. This
module provides guidance on storage space planning, taking into consideration the
allowable explosives limits of storage facilities. This module is designed to help
users align their storage facility space requirements more closely with their available
stockpile needs, towards safer and more effective storage of ammunition.
Module 06.30
Storage and
handling

Improper storage and handling of ammunition increases the potential for damage,
which may negatively impact its reliability and safety, or lead to UEMS. Damaged
ammunition has to be either repaired or destroyed and then replaced, which may
result in significant financial cost. The protection of ammunition from such damage is
one of the controls discussed in Module 06.10.
This module provides an overview of general practical considerations and
requirements for the safe storage and handling of ammunition in facilities and for
inter-facility transportation. It references related modules, all of which provide
additional guidance and requirements for important aspects of safe ammunition
storage, processing and transport.
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Module 06.40
Ammunition
packaging and
marking

The correct packaging of ammunition – which is designed and tested to demonstrate
that it provides the required protection throughout its service life – is a key safety
measure. Packaging is also designed to assist the processes of ammunition
movement, storage and handling. The removal of ammunition from its approved
packaging exposes it to damage and other potential hazards, such as environmental
effects, insects, dirt and electromagnetic energy, which can have a serious impact
on its safety and reliability. For this reason, ammunition should always be kept in its
approved packaging until needed. In addition, taking ammunition out of UN-approved
shipping packaging can affect its hazard classification. Changes in classification
must be accounted for as part of the management of explosives facilities (see
Module 06.10). The UN hazard classification system is detailed in Module 01.50.
Proper markings, labels and seals on ammunition and packaging communicate
critical safety and security information, allowing for proper storage, handling and
transport of ammunition. Some are required by the UN hazard classification system,
while others support management and control processes in facilities, as discussed in
this module and Module 06.10. This module provides general, practical information
and basic requirements related to ammunition packaging and its markings, with the
aim of raising user awareness of the many considerations involved.

Module 06.50
Specific safety
precautions
(storage and
operations)

The chemicals that are used to manufacture ammunition are generally hazardous.
They are toxic to humans, posing health risks through inhalation, ingestion and
absorption through both the skin and the eyes. Some ammunition items require
additional safety considerations because they present unique risks. These must be
considered and incorporated into management and control processes in explosives
facilities (see Module 06.10).
The purpose of this module is to highlight additional safety precautions, basic
requirements, and mitigation factors for ammunition in general, as well as for unique
ammunition items and component materials, such as :
• ammunition filled with dangerous substances, such as white or red phosphorus,
which, if cracked or damaged, can leak and upon contact with air spontaneously
ignite ;
• phosphide-filled ammunition, which is activated by water and, if cracked or
damaged, can interact with water in any state and produce toxic and flammable
phosphine gas ;
• finely divided powdered metals (in bulk and in ammunition), which can generate
hydrogen gas upon contact with water and form an explosive hydrogen/air
mixture ;
• ammunition or components recovered through explosive ordnance disposal (EOD),
such as unexploded ordnance ;
• ammunition for museums, souvenirs, displays and training aids, or surplus
products and salvageable leftover materials from manufacturing, demilitarization
or other similar processes.
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Module 06.60
Works services
(construction and
repair)

Contract personnel working in an area where explosives are stored, processed or
transported must be properly managed and monitored for their own safety and
the safety of others. To minimize risks and ensure compliance with the necessary
requirements, management and control measures must be implemented for any
work involving – or carried out in the proximity of – an explosives facility. The
measures are to be applied regardless of the scope of the work - be it major, minor or
routine – and irrespective of who is carrying it out (see Module 06.10).

Module 06.70
Inspection of
explosives
facilities

An important element of managing explosives facilities is the carrying out of
inspections by the establishment responsible for the facilities as well as by national
authorities with oversight responsibilities. The absence of an inspection process or
programme to address inspection faults can lead to unplanned explosions. For this
reason, it is critical that national authorities require their explosives establishments
to document and track periodic inspections of explosives facilities, inspection faults
and the status of fault corrections and repairs. In addition, national authorities
should monitor these establishments’ processes and provide oversight to ensure
compliance with the IATG and their own national processes.
This module explains the importance of having both a comprehensive inspection
process and an aggressive fault correction system in place. It underscores the
potential ramifications of being deficient in these areas. It also describes a
recommended procedure for conducting inspections of explosives facilities,
recommends timeframes for periodic inspections, provides a sample logbook that
identifies areas in the explosives facility that should be inspected, and provides
a sample format for recording inspections and faults. Users should adapt these
as necessary for each of their explosives facilities. Lastly, this module addresses
national authorities’ oversight responsibilities and provides a checklist format for
them to use when inspecting their explosives establishments.

Module 06.80
Inspection of
ammunition

Inspection of ammunition is necessary to ensure its safety, reliability and
performance. The level of inspection and complexity of the effort depends on the
reason for the inspection. Some are basic external inspections of ammunition or its
packaging, while others – such as surveillance breakdown of ammunition and the
collection of propellant or explosives samples (see Module 07.20) – are significantly
more complex and require additional resources, training and preparation time.
This module presents general information on ammunition safety and common
inspection points. It provides guidance for the conduct of a basic risk assessment
prior to any explosives processing operation (see Module 02.10) ; outlines three
types of ammunition inspections –routine, technical and safe to move – and offers
advice on physical inspections, including for 25 generic types of ammunition.
The module is also designed to help users assign status codes and other markings to
indicate the status of inspected ammunition : serviceable, unavailable or banned.
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This module describes the key roles and major responsibilities associated with
explosives safety with respect to contractors, a visiting workforce, and explosives
area support workers. It provides procedures and safety requirements for the
control and management of such personnel, as well as the approval, monitoring
and management of work involving – or carried out in the proximity of – explosives
facilities.
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IATG Volume 07 – Ammunition Processing
Module 07.10
Safety and
risk reduction
(ammunition
processing
operations)

Any operation involving ammunition potentially increases the risk of UEMS.
Explosions can be initiated by a multitude of external stimuli, and a minor event can
quickly escalate into a major one. As a result, full consideration must be given to
every explosives processing operation, regardless of the level of complexity involved,
so as to assess all potential risks.

Module 07.20
Surveillance and
in-service proof

Since ammunition deteriorates over time, it has a finite serviceable life.
Surveillance and in-service proofs are used to monitor its condition and gauge
any safety deterioration or performance degradation ; these processes also fulfill
the ammunition inspection requirements provided in Module 06.80. An accurate
appraisal of an ammunition item’s state and remaining lifespan is important to
ensure both safety and cost-effectiveness. Such a determination ensures the most
advantageous return on what can be a heavy investment.

It is difficult to control and manage risks and develop a risk reduction strategy for
an explosives operation if potential risks are unknown. For this reason, this module
starts with general guidance on the carrying out of a risk assessment (see Module
02.10). Users are then systematically guided on how to translate findings into safety
measures, namely through the establishment and implementation of user-developed
“safe systems of work”. Such systems, guided by risk assessment results in
conjunction with guidance and requirements from this module, should also address
other areas that are part of the control and management of explosives facilities (see
Module 06.10). In addition, the module provides guidance on general safety aspects
of ammunition and explosives processing.

This module explains both the rationale for, as well as the importance of,
surveillance and in-service proof processes. In providing guidance and requirements
that national authorities can use to develop their own processes, it serves to
address areas such as national regulation, responsibilities, requirements for
effective programmes, and the establishment and implementation of relevant
processes, including the collection of baseline data, sample selection, scheduling
and documentation. Also included is strong advice related to propellants, some of
which can spontaneously ignite upon depletion of their stabilizer content below
minimum levels. This depletion process is unstoppable and irreversible and has
resulted in many catastrophic UEMS. Once stabilizer content is depleted, the only
safe solution is immediate isolation and disposal of the ammunition. With advance
warning through a surveillance programme, such ammunition could possibly be used
in training before it becomes unsafe to handle or store, which would allow an owner
to optimize its use.
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IATG Volume 08 – Transport of Ammunition
Module 08.10
Transport of
ammunition

International agreements and regulations govern the transport of dangerous
goods, including ammunition. Without them, and given that national transportation
regulations vary greatly across States, the international movement of dangerous
goods would be severely impeded, if not impossible. These international regulations
rely on the UN hazard classification system, which is almost universally accepted by
States and which provides a common platform for safe transport (see Module 01.50).
All other international transport agreements and regulations build on the UN system.

Attachments

This module explains how the UN system is used by organizations responsible
for developing international regulations for the safe transport of ammunition
and explosives by truck, rail, air and sea. It discusses each of these modes of
transport and the international regulations and requirements that govern them.
The ammunition-related regulations on the transport of dangerous goods in these
international agreements apply only if a national authority has adopted them for
internal use. States that adopt them benefit from a harmonized and safe system for
classifying and transporting ammunition. The quantity distances in Module 02.20 are
based on the UN hazard classification system, an IATG RRPL 3 requirement.

IATG Volume 09 – Security of Ammunition
Module 09.10
Security
principles and
systems

The physical security of ammunition stockpiles is an essential part of through-life
management as it reduces the risk of loss, theft, leakage and proliferation
(collectively referred to as “diversion”) as well as acts of malfeasance, such as
sabotage. Physical security is especially important in regions of instability and
post-conflict environments, where basic security steps can have a very large impact
in terms of preventing diversion. When compared to the value of an ammunition
stockpile, the financial costs associated with taking security precautions are minimal.
Security costs should not be viewed simply as an expense ; they should be balanced
against the potential costs associated with poor security leading to UEMS. Effective
and efficient physical security of a State’s ammunition stockpile is consistent with
IATG guiding principles (see Module 01.10). States are advised to adopt an active,
rather than reactive, approach to accounting for and securing their ammunition (see
Module 03.10).
This module is designed to help improve physical security standards for ammunition
stockpiles. It establishes guiding principles for physical security, details the various
elements of physical security, provides guidance and requirements for implementing
these elements, defines the necessary procedures, and introduces technical security
systems in support of the through-life management of ammunition.
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Module 10.10
Demilitarization
and destruction
of conventional
ammunition

A number of IATG modules note that certain stockpile management activities can
generate unsafe, damaged or excess ammunition-related materials that may need to
be demilitarized or destroyed. In addition, certain international treaties, agreements
and instruments refer to or require the destruction of ammunition. States that intend
to destroy ammunition can avail themselves of various techniques, ranging from
relatively simple open burning and detonation, to highly sophisticated industrial
demilitarization processes. Each of these processes requires expert knowledge and
carries a unique set of risks. States are advised to carry out comprehensive planning to
be able to select the most appropriate and efficient process and to execute it safely.
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This module provides general guidance on and introduces a technical methodology
for the safe planning and execution of ammunition demilitarization and destruction
activities in support of through-life management. It does not provide a template for
demilitarization and destruction as there are many different factors to consider ;
instead, it focuses on core activities that are common to most destruction processes.

IATG Volume 11 – Ammunition Accidents, Reporting and Investigation
Module 11.10
Ammunition
accidents :
reporting and
investigation

Reporting and investigating ammunition accidents are fundamental, preventive safety
measures. All accidents should be immediately reported and properly investigated
so that appropriate action can be taken. Delays in reporting and responding, or the
failure to conduct a proper investigation, may perpetuate a dangerous situation and
increase the likelihood of an accident.
This module introduces the overall rationale behind accident reporting and investigation.
It presents a classification system for accidents and provides guidance on actions
that can be taken when an accident occurs ; accident reporting procedures ; and
the related responsibilities of the established investigation authority and assigned
technical investigator. National authorities that wish to develop requirements for
accident reporting and investigation can use this module as well as Module 11.20,
which covers a specific methodology for conducting an accident investigation.

Module 11.20
Ammunition
accidents :
investigation
methodology

Reporting and investigating ammunition accidents is important to ensure that causes
are identified and appropriate actions taken to prevent a reoccurrence or UEMS.
Conducting an investigation is never a simple matter. Accidents are not usually the
result of a single failure, but rather result from a series of progressive and sequential
events or failures that together eventually cause an accident. Determining the causes
of an accident requires the application of a systematic and deliberate approach using
a proven and agreed-upon methodology.
This module introduces and describes the basic elements of an accident investigation
and provides a methodology for conducting one. It includes topics such as gaining
assistance from other agencies and technical experts, gathering evidence and
interviewing witnesses. It provides a checklist that helps to guide and track
investigation activities. In addition, it includes lists of generic questions, divided by
major topics - such as ammunition, personnel qualifications, and procedures - that can
be used by an investigator.
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IATG Volume 11 – Ammunition Accidents, Reporting and Investigation
Module 11.30
Ammunition
storage area
explosions : EOD
clearance

Based on the number of UEMS that occur each year around the world, it is highly
likely that some IATG users will need to oversee post-event explosive ordnance
disposal clearance. As these situations are extremely dangerous, cleanup is best left
to experienced and qualified organizations. An understanding of the consequences
of UEMS and of the particulars of post-UEMS cleanups can underscore the need to
maintain safe and secure ammunition stockpiles.
This module explains the extreme danger associated with post-event situations,
during which ammunition and explosives - in a variety of hazardous conditions - may
be scattered over large areas. It details the potential consequences of such an
event on the surrounding people and areas, as well as the hazards that have to be
addressed. It provides basic clearance principles and guidance on the development of
a clearance methodology and the clearance operation itself. An example of an EOD
clearance order is provided as an annex to this module.

Module 12.10
Ammunition on
multi-national
operations

This module provides guidance on the storage, handling, and use of ammunition
and explosives for personnel deployed in multi-national operations. It provides
basic planning guidance for selecting appropriate locations for the safe storage
of ammunition from troop-contributing nations, details key force level explosives
safety and risk management roles and responsibilities, and identifies the required
competencies for a multi-national force explosives safety officer. It establishes
the minimum safety requirements for unit personnel and the public ; specifically, it
features a table that refers to appropriate IATG modules and paragraphs, to meet
RRPL 1 stockpile management requirements, at a minimum. A force’s goal should be
to strive for higher RRPLs to reduce risk.
The guidance in this module encourages all troop-contributing nations to certify that
ammunition deployed in support of multi-national operations is “safe to deploy” and
is subject to surveillance and in-service proof programmes that are fully compliant
with Module 07.20.

Module 12.20
Small unit
ammunition
storage

Small unit organizations such as police or isolated military units - many of which
operate in heavily populated urban areas - handle ammunition on an almost daily
basis although they may not have received the necessary training to do so. Such a
lack of training has led to deaths and injuries in a number of catastrophic UEMS.
This module provides guidance for individuals in small units who are responsible for
ammunition handling, storage and management. Since many basic safe handling and
storage requirements in the IATG are also directly applicable to small units, this module
provides a requirements checklist that points to appropriate IATG modules and paragraphs
to meet RRPL 1 stockpile management requirements, as a minimum. As compliance
may be difficult to achieve, this module offers advice on the use of a risk management
approach (see Module 02.10) and the importance of communicating risks to all potentially
affected parties, especially when compliance with the IATG cannot be achieved. Wherever
possible, small units should apply quantity distances (see Module 02.20).
Small units may accumulate large amounts of ammunition whose safety status is
unknown, including as part of criminal investigations. This module includes warnings
and guidance on isolating or disposing of such dangerous materials as quickly as
possible, in accordance with the governing national legal framework or protocol.
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ANNEX II : PROCESS FOR PRODUCING NATIONAL STANDARDS
Understand the problem
Baseline risk assessments

Analysis of environment

Capabilities assessment

Initiate legislation
Risk acceptance

Safeguarding law

Formalizing national authority

Map the options and choose the most appropriate
Commitment to safe
ammunition management

Understanding challenges

Demonstration of commitment
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Establish strategy and priorities
International
norms

Regional
obligations

Existing national
norms

IATG

Decision on
national standards

Assign goals and milestones
Prioritization of activities

Drafting national standards

SMART objectives

Allocate resources to achieve goals
Real estate

Equipment

Funds

Time

Implement, review and amend
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ANNEX III : PESTLE FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN NATIONAL
AMMUNITION RISK MAPPING
Various external factors may positively influence ammunition risks, thus creating
opportunities ; or negatively, thus posing a threat 42). The PESTLE factors to consider
are political, economic, socio-ethical, technological, legal and environmental :

Economic factors such as gross domestic product (GDP), economic growth, interest
rates, exchange rates, inflation rate, tax policy and level of unemployment all affect
the State’s purchasing power and cost of capital. National interest rates and fiscal
policy are set around economic conditions, which then influence the purchasing
power of government and commerce as well as the structure of their expenditure.
The analyst will take these and any other economic factors into account to inform
the strategy.
Social forces influence our attitudes, interests and opinions, creating our behaviour
and ultimately what is expected or acceptable within a society, e.g. societal and
individual risks to life. In this context, societal factors can include : structure of population, birth rates, accident rates, increase of global population, level of education,
cultural diversity and standards and norms. Ethical factors involve duties, morality,
integrity, behaviour, what is good and bad for the State, organizations, employees
and society as a whole. Ultimately, the analyst uses socio-ethical factors to inform
the strategy on how the government and the society at large view the impact of
diversion of ammunition and accidental explosions at munitions sites.
Technological advances can change the way in which governments and organizations operate.Technological factors such as R&D activity, automation, technological
incentives, or the rate of technological change, can remove or place barriers for
the successful strategy outcome. They can also enhance productivity levels and
sway outsourcing decisions, which might include the development of home-grown
expertise and the reduction of reliance on support from international assistance
providers. Understanding the existing and potential capacity for technological development can inform the development of an ammunition and explosives safety and
security strategy that is achievable and sustainable. In many States, technological
progress has created a society which expects instant results, which can be a cause
of friction between the affected State and well-intentioned international assistance
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Political factors include government regulations and legal issues such as : political
situation, political stability, State interference, market regulations, trade agreements,
tariffs or restrictions, tax policy and taxes, employment laws, environmental regulations, lobbying and clarity of law. They define both formal and informal rules that a
State must abide by, so they can create advantages and opportunities for both the
State and organizations.The analyst should have the freedom to explore and present
the positive and negative effects of political factors so that the national authority
can consider all possible outcomes, to develop appropriate policy and strategy.

providers, if the affected State is not at the same level of technological development
and integration. New technologies can increase the rate at which information is
exchanged between stakeholders. A faster exchange of information can benefit
governments and organizations as they are able to react more quickly to changes.
The analyst should consider the absorptive capacity for innovation of the State and
of society, to inform the strategy about if and when the State could and should
introduce new technologies.
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Legal factors are a subset of the above-mentioned political factors, which involve
all regulatory and law determinants that can negatively or positively affect results
of internal and external stakeholder actions and the decisions of government. The
analyst must identify and consider these factors, such as international, regional and
national legal restraints, regulations and guidance, independently for every activity
relating to ammunition and explosives. These are factors which deal with legal
complications.The analyst will need to check on new and pending legal requirements
to ensure compliance.
Environmental factors include environmental protection legislation, pollution, waste
management and disposal, clean air and water, wind, energy saving technologies
and attitudes towards ecology in society. The environmental factors assess what
kind of impact an activity is having, or might have, on the environment. The impact
can either be negative or positive and the analyst should consider both in order
to inform policy-makers so that they make choices relevant to their own State’s
situation and aspirations.

Political

Environmental

Economic

National
Ammunition
Stockpile
Legal

Social

Technological
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ANNEX IV : CAPABILITY LINES OF DEVELOPMENT

• Training. The provision of the means to practise, develop and validate, within
constraints, the practical application of a common military doctrine to deliver a
military capability.
• Equipment.The provision of military platforms, systems and weapons (expendable
and non-expendable, including updates to legacy systems) needed to outfit or
equip an individual, group or organization.
• Personnel. The timely provision of sufficient, capable and motivated personnel
to deliver defence outputs, now and in the future.
• Information. The provision of a coherent development of data, information and
knowledge requirements for capabilities and all processes designed to gather and
handle data, information and knowledge. Data is defined as raw facts, without
inherent meaning, used by humans and systems. Information is defined as data
placed in context. Knowledge is information applied to a particular situation.
• Concepts and doctrine. A concept refers to capabilities to be used to accomplish
an activity in the future. Doctrine is an expression of the principles by which the
military guide their actions and is a codification of how activity is conducted today.
• Organisation. Relates to the operational and non-operational organisational relationships of people. It typically includes military forces, line ministries and civilian
organisations as well as the structure of defence contractors providing support.
• Infrastructure. The acquisition, development, management and disposal of all
fixed, permanent buildings and structures, land, utilities and facility management
services in support of defence capabilities. It includes estate development and
structures that support all personnel.
• Logistics. The science of planning that takes care of the forces’ movement and
maintenance. It encompasses activities in the design and development, acquisition,
storage, transport, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposition of material ;
transport of personnel ; acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation and
disposition of facilities ; and furnishing of services, including medical and health
service support.
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The UK Ministry of Defence manages eight capability lines of development in its
acquisition framework. Interoperability should be considered as an overarching
theme that encompasses all lines of development. It implies the ability for an armed
force and its branches of service, civilian contractors, service providers and relevant
national authorities and ministries to work together in a compatible manner whilst
performing very different roles and tasks. Interoperability extends to the interaction
between services, defence capabilities, other government departments and the
civil aspects of interoperability, including compatibility with civil legislation and
standards. The capability lines of development 43) are briefly characterized below :

ANNEX V : IATG RATIONALE FOR A NATIONAL SAFEGUARDING LAW
One of the most efficient means of protecting the public from the effects of an
explosive event is by using separation distances, 44) which ensure that the general
population and their properties are always at a tolerably safe distance from the
explosives during storage and handling. These separation distances frequently
extend beyond the boundary of the explosives facility. Past experience has shown
that without a system of safeguarding the land outside the facility boundary, the
civilian population may build dwellings or commercial installations thereby negating
the effective separation distance. If this occurs there are only two options available
to the ammunition storage facility :
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1) The explosive quantity permitted for storage shall be reduced within the
facility ; or
2) The increased risk to the civilian population shall be formally accepted, even
if it is above the tolerable risk level.
Either option is undesirable.
The alternative options of :
1) Moving the civilian population from the area ; or
2) Moving the ammunition storage area ;
are national, political decisions.Therefore, to ensure that explosives facilities are not
compromised by civil encroachment of private or public land development within the
explosion danger area of the facility, a system of safeguarding should be established
and incorporated within the laws of the State. To achieve this, a formal system of
safeguarding 45) that permits the ammunition storage organization to influence what
activities are permitted within the explosion danger area, should be developed and
implemented.
Local authorities have to be made aware of the status of an ammunition storage
area and are to ensure that the national authority is notified should any building
or development work begin in the area marked on a safeguarding map. This map
should be produced by the national authority and distributed to local authorities
whose area of responsibility is affected by the storage area. This map should have
marked on it :
• The inhabited building distance (IBD), marked with a yellow line, indicating the area
where no inhabited buildings should be developed ;
• The vulnerable building distance (VBD), marked with a purple line, indicating the
area where no vulnerable buildings (churches, schools, curtain wall structures,
vital structures, etc.) should be developed ;
• The area owned by the explosives facility, marked in red.
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ANNEX VI : AVAILABLE ASSISTANCE

• Recognizes the urgency of addressing the security and safety risks emanating
from ineffective stockpile management around the world ;
• Recognizes the importance of appropriate national ammunition management
structures and procedures, including laws and regulations, training and doctrine,
equipment and maintenance, personnel management, and finances and infrastructure in order to ensure sustainability in ammunition management ;
• Encourages States in a position to do so to assist interested States within a bilateral
framework or through international or regional organizations, including through
activities conducted under the umbrella of the SaferGuard knowledge resource
management programme, on a voluntary and transparent basis, in elaborating
and implementing programmes to eliminate surplus stockpiles or to improve
stockpile management.
States seeking assistance for the development of a national normative framework
for ammunition management have many options available, some of which are outlined
below.
International
UN SaferGuard Programme
Under the Quick-response Mechanism, the UN SaferGuard Programme arranges
for ammunition management assistance, including technical assessments, training
for personnel, technical and policy support and/or clearance activities, in accordance
with the IATG. 46)
States wishing to engage the UN SaferGuard Programme should contact UNODA
at : conventionalarms-unoda@un.org
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
UNMAS operates under UN legislative mandates from both the General Assembly
and the Security Council. UNMAS is an integral component of UN peace operations
and special political missions. UNMAS responds to specific requests from affected
Member States, the UN Secretary-General or designated officials to assist in storage,
inspection, transportation and stockpile destruction of ammunition.
Contact : unmasgeneva@un.org
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The latest iteration of the General Assembly resolution “Problems arising from the
accumulation of stockpiles of ammunition in surplus”, A/RES/72/55 :

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)
Under the Conventional Weapons Programme, UNIDIR conducts weapons and
ammunition management research and projects to enhance the capacity of national
policymakers and relevant security authorities, tasked with leading or supporting
the design and strengthening of a national framework related to the governance and
management of weapons and ammunition. More specifically, UNIDIR endeavours
to support States and UN partners in their efforts to establish accountable and
transparent weapons and ammunition management policies and plans, and to help
monitor and assess progress.
States wishing to contact UNIDIR may reach them at : unidir@un.org
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Government to government
Many States are willing to provide assistance through their department for foreign
affairs or possibly through a specific department for international development.This
assistance might be for either humanitarian, historical relationship or commercial/
trade purposes. Such assistance can take the form of training, education, technical
or legal advice and support, infrastructure projects, trade treaties, etc.
Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG)
The Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG)47) is an informal grouping
of similar-minded States seeking to exchange best practices, build capacity on
physical security and stockpile management (PSSM), and promote knowledge
transfer with regard to SALW and conventional ammunition, including the provision of
advice and support in the field of disposal and destruction of SALW and conventional
ammunition.
States seeking assistance from MSAG should use the instructions in the publicly
available MSAG handbook. 48)
Bilateral
Governments may have bilateral partnerships which often extend to arrangements
for knowledge and technology transfer that can be applied to the safe and secure
management of ammunition and explosives.
During and in the immediate aftermath of conflict, military assistance is most often
in the form of “equip and train”, i.e. the assisting State will provide equipment to the
requesting State as well as training with the equipment for its designed purpose.
In well-developed bilateral relationships, it is often possible for the affected State to
receive more advanced training and education. This type of training and education
can be in the form of advanced courses of instruction held in the assisting State’s
training or academic establishments. Some States also offer opportunities for short
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or long-term attachments in technical units, which provide the “learner” from the
assisted State with the chance to learn new skills in a practical setting. States may
also wish to share technical expertise, advice and support.
Regional collaboration
There are many relevant inter-governmental and regional organizations which may
offer ammunition management assistance, 49) including the United Nations Regional
Centres for Peace and Disarmament (UNLIREC, UNREC and UNRCPD), 50) African
Union (AU), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Organization of
American States (OAS), European Union (EU) and Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Though the US Department of Defense has its own weapons development, research
facilities and explosives safety programmes, because of its close relationship with
NATO, US ammunition life cycle safety is addressed cooperatively within NATO
Allied Committee (AC) 326, also known as the Ammunition Safety Group, and its three
subgroups.This process and the subject matter material have expanded and evolved
since the early 1960s and continues to this day, towards addressing life-cycle aspects :
design, manufacture, suitability for service, hazard classification and packaging,
surveillance, storage, transportation, and disposal.These activities are not carried out
because of a particular accident has occurred, but to help pool ideas, experience and
resources, assess accident and test information, and enhance capabilities towards the
development of “best practice” in common standards and procedural guidance on
munitions and explosives safety.These activities foster interoperability in NATO-led
operations, promote the potential for interchangeability of ammunition, and establish
a basis for coordinated procurement of munitions and explosives.These, in turn, have
been integrated into US and other NATO nations’ requirements documents and are the
basis for much of the content found in the IATG.
Author : Eric J. Deschambault.
Source : Unpublished background paper.
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Box 6 – Ammunition management cooperative approach – NATO and United States

International and non-governmental organisations
States may be aware of international (IO) and non-governmental organizations (NGO)
that can offer assistance in specific areas of expertise. There are several IOs and
NGOs offering expert services that are relevant to the safe and secure management
of ammunition and explosives. They come from defence and civil backgrounds and
possess expertise and experience that they can bring to the table. Because of this
diversity, States wishing to engage such experts should consider the organization’s
knowledge and practical experience specifically with the IATG, as opposed to
knowledge on a single State’s regulation.
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In the context of safe and secure management of ammunition and explosives, the
most obvious IOs and NGOs are those working in the fields of explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD), PSSM, and weapons and ammunition management. These are
the IOs and NGOs that a State may do well engaging with in the early years of
implementing its ammunition and explosives safety and security strategy.
As the strategy develops and the affected State becomes more resourceful, its own
capabilities should take over the running of many or all of the facilities and activities.
IOs and NGOs may then continue to provide expertise and advice on complex tasks
such as long-term procurement strategy and planning, the sustainable demilitarization
of surplus stocks, environmental testing and in-service surveillance of stocks of
ammunition and explosives.
There is no single clearing house or list of IOs and NGOs but States wishing to engage
could seek impartial advice, for example, from the UN SaferGuard Programme 51) or
the Ammunition Management Advisory Team (AMAT). 52)
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